On Mon, 7 Nov 2022 09:19:43 -0400
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2022 at 04:45:26PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
>
> > > It is one idea, it depends how literal you want to be on "module
> > > parameters are ABI". IMHO it is a weak form of ABI and the need of
> > > this paramter in particular is not that common in modern times, AFAIK.
> > >
> > > So perhaps we just also expose it through vfio.ko and expect people to
> > > migrate. That would give a window were both options are available.
> >
> > That might be best. Ultimately this is an opt-out of a feature that
> > has security implications, so I'd rather error on the side of requiring
> > the user to re-assert that opt-out. It seems the potential good in
> > eliminating stale or unnecessary options outweighs any weak claims of
> > preserving an ABI for a module that's no longer in service.
>
> Ok, lets do this
>
> --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c
> @@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ static struct vfio {
> bool vfio_allow_unsafe_interrupts;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfio_allow_unsafe_interrupts);
>
> +module_param_named(allow_unsafe_interrupts,
> + vfio_allow_unsafe_interrupts, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(allow_unsafe_interrupts,
> + "Enable VFIO IOMMU support for on platforms without interrupt remapping support.");
> +
> static DEFINE_XARRAY(vfio_device_set_xa);
> static const struct file_operations vfio_group_fops;
>
> > However, I'd question whether vfio is the right place for that new
> > module option. As proposed, vfio is only passing it through to
> > iommufd, where an error related to lack of the hardware feature is
> > masked behind an -EPERM by the time it gets back to vfio, making any
> > sort of advisory to the user about the module option convoluted. It
> > seems like iommufd should own the option to opt-out universally, not
> > just through the vfio use case. Thanks,
>
> My thinking is this option shouldn't exist at all in other iommufd
> users. eg I don't see value in VDPA supporting it.
I disagree, the IOMMU interface is responsible for isolating the
device, this option doesn't make any sense to live in vfio-main, which
is the reason it was always a type1 option. If vdpa doesn't allow full
device access such that it can guarantee that a device cannot generate
a DMA that can spoof MSI, then it sounds like the flag we pass when
attaching a device to iommfd should to reflect this difference in usage.
The driver either requires full isolation, default, or can indicate a
form of restricted DMA programming that prevents interrupt spoofing.
The policy whether to permit unsafe configurations should exist in one
place, iommufd. Thanks,
Alex
