Re: [PATCH] KVM: s390: Fix lockdep issue in vm memop

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On 3/23/22 10:30, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
> 
> 
> Am 23.03.22 um 09:57 schrieb Janosch Frank:
>> On 3/23/22 09:52, Janis Schoetterl-Glausch wrote:
>>> On 3/23/22 08:58, Janosch Frank wrote:
>>>> On 3/22/22 16:32, Janis Schoetterl-Glausch wrote:
>>>>> Issuing a memop on a protected vm does not make sense,
>>>>
>>>> Issuing a vm memop on a protected vm...
>>>>
>>>> The cpu memop still makes sense, no?
>>>
>>> The vcpu memop does hold the vcpu->lock, so no lockdep issue.
>>> If you issue a vcpu memop while enabling protected virtualization,
>>> the memop might find that the vcpu is not protected, while other vcpus
>>> might already be, but I don't think there's a way to create secure memory
>>> concurrent with the memop.
>>
>> I just wanted you to make this a bit more specific since we now have vm and vcpu memops. vm memops don't make sense for pv guests but vcpu ones are needed to access the sida.
> 
> Right, I think changing the commit messages
> - Issuing a memop on a protected vm does not make sense
> + Issuing a vm memop on a protected vm does not make sense
> 
> does make sense.

Ok, want me to send a v2?
> 
>>
>>>>
>>>>> neither is the memory readable/writable, nor does it make sense to check
>>>>> storage keys. This is why the ioctl will return -EINVAL when it detects
>>>>> the vm to be protected. However, in order to ensure that the vm cannot
>>>>> become protected during the memop, the kvm->lock would need to be taken
>>>>> for the duration of the ioctl. This is also required because
>>>>> kvm_s390_pv_is_protected asserts that the lock must be held.
>>>>> Instead, don't try to prevent this. If user space enables secure
>>>>> execution concurrently with a memop it must accecpt the possibility of
>>>>> the memop failing.
>>>>> Still check if the vm is currently protected, but without locking and
>>>>> consider it a heuristic.
>>>>>
>>>>> Fixes: ef11c9463ae0 ("KVM: s390: Add vm IOCTL for key checked guest absolute memory access")
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>
>>>> Makes sense to me.
>>>>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 11 ++++++++++-
>>>>>    1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>>>>> index ca96f84db2cc..53adbe86a68f 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>>>>> @@ -2385,7 +2385,16 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_mem_op(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s390_mem_op *mop)
>>>>>            return -EINVAL;
>>>>>        if (mop->size > MEM_OP_MAX_SIZE)
>>>>>            return -E2BIG;
>>>>> -    if (kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(kvm))
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * This is technically a heuristic only, if the kvm->lock is not
>>>>> +     * taken, it is not guaranteed that the vm is/remains non-protected.
>>>>> +     * This is ok from a kernel perspective, wrongdoing is detected
>>>>> +     * on the access, -EFAULT is returned and the vm may crash the
>>>>> +     * next time it accesses the memory in question.
>>>>> +     * There is no sane usecase to do switching and a memop on two
>>>>> +     * different CPUs at the same time.
>>>>> +     */
>>>>> +    if (kvm_s390_pv_get_handle(kvm))
>>>>>            return -EINVAL;
>>>>>        if (mop->flags & KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION) {
>>>>>            if (access_key_invalid(mop->key))
>>>>>
>>>>> base-commit: c9b8fecddb5bb4b67e351bbaeaa648a6f7456912
>>>>
>>>
>>




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