On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 06:58:51AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2022-02-16 at 11:56 +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 05:12:32PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2022-02-15 at 21:47 +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> > > > Hello,
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 03:08:18PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > > [Cc'ing Eric Snowberg]
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi Michal,
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, 2022-02-15 at 20:39 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > > > > Commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify")
> > > > > > adds support for use of platform keyring in kexec verification but
> > > > > > support for modules is missing.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Add support for verification of modules with keys from platform keyring
> > > > > > as well.
> > > > >
> > > > > Permission for loading the pre-OS keys onto the "platform" keyring and
> > > > > using them is limited to verifying the kexec kernel image, nothing
> > > > > else.
> > > >
> > > > Why is the platform keyring limited to kexec, and nothing else?
> > > >
> > > > It should either be used for everything or for nothing. You have the
> > > > option to compile it in and then it should be used, and the option to
> > > > not compile it in and then it cannot be used.
> > > >
> > > > There are two basic use cases:
> > > >
> > > > (1) there is a vendor key which is very hard to use so you sign
> > > > something small and simple like shim with the vendor key, and sign your
> > > > kernel and modules with your own key that's typically enrolled with shim
> > > > MOK, and built into the kernel.
> > > >
> > > > (2) you import your key into the firmware, and possibly disable the
> > > > vendor key. You can load the kernel directly without shim, and then your
> > > > signing key is typically in the platform keyring and built into the
> > > > kernel.
> > > >
> > > > In neither case do I see any reason to use some keyrings for kexec and
> > > > other keyrings for modules.
> > >
> > > When building your own kernel there isn't a problem. Additional keys
> > > may be built into the kernel image, which are loaded onto the
> > > ".builtin_trusted_keys" keyring, and may be stored in MOK. Normally
> > > different keys are used for signing the kernel image and kernel
> >
> > That's actually not normal.
> >
> > > modules. Kernel modules can be signed by the build time ephemeral
> > > kernel module signing key, which is built into the kernel and
> > > automatically loaded onto the ".builtin_trusted_keys" keyring.
> >
> > Right, there is this advice to use ephemeral key to sign modules.
> >
> > I don't think that's a sound advice in general. It covers only the
> > special case when you build the kernel once, only rebuild the whole
> > kernel and never just one module, don't use any 3rd party module, don't
> > bother signing firmware (I am not sure that is supported right now but
> > if you are into integrity and stuff you can see that it makes sense to
> > sign it, too).
> >
> > And you need to manage the key you use for the kernel signing, anyway.
> > Sure, you could use the same ephemeral key as for the modules, enroll
> > it, and shred it but then it is NOT a key different from the one you use
> > for modules.
> >
> > Or you could maintain a long-lived key for the kernel, but if you do I
> > do NOT see any reason to not use it also for modules, in-tree and
> > out-of-tree.
>
> If signing ALL kernel modules, in-tree and out-of-tree, with the same
> key as the kernel image, is your real intention, then by all means
Why would you sign them with different keys, specifically?
For out of tree modules, sure. But that's an ADDITIONAL key, not
REMOVAL of a key.
> write a complete patch description with the motivation for why kernel
> module signatures need to be verified against this one pre-OS key
> stored only in the platform keyring. Such a major change like this
> shouldn't be buried here.
No, in my book it does not make sense to verify anything against the
pre-os key at all in the common case.
However, if you do verify the kernel against the pre-os key it does not
make sense to not verify modules against the pre-os key. There is no
sense using different key for kernel and modules. They are both built in
the same environment with access to same the keys.
> Otherwise, I suggest looking at Eric Snowberg's "Enroll kernel keys
> thru MOK patch set" patch set [1], as previously mentioned, which is
> queued to be upstreamed by Jarkko. It loads MOK keys onto the
> '.machine' keyring, which is linked to the '.secondary_trusted_keys"
> keyring. A subsequent patch set will enable IMA support.
I don't really care how many keyrings there are. What I care about is
that they are used conssitently.
Thanks
Michal
