On 12.02.20 12:03, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Tue, 11 Feb 2020 21:03:17 +0100 > Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> On 11.02.20 13:23, Thomas Huth wrote: >>> On 07/02/2020 12.39, Christian Borntraeger wrote: >>>> +The switch into PV mode lets us load encrypted guest executables and >>> >>> Maybe rather: "After the switch into PV mode, the guest can load ..." ? >> >> No its not after the switch. By doing the switch the guest image can be loaded >> fro anywhere because it is just like a kernel. >> >> So I will do: >> >> As the guest image is just like an opaque kernel image that does the >> switch into PV mode itself, the user can load encrypted guest >> executables and data via every available method (network, dasd, scsi, >> direct kernel, ...) without the need to change the boot process. > > Sounds good to me. > > (...) > >>>> +All non-decrypted data of the guest before it switches to protected >>>> +virtualization mode are zero on first access of the PV. >>> >>> Before it switches to protected virtualization mode, all non-decrypted >>> data of the guest are ... ? >> >> No, this is about the data after the initial import. >> What about >> >> After the initial import of the encrypted data all defined pages will > > s/data/data,/ ack. > >> contain the guest content. All non-specified pages will start out as >> zero pages on first access. > > Also sounds good to me. > > (...) >
