Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 6 +++++-
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 8 +++++++-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
mitigations=
- [X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
- vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
+ [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+ CPU vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+ kpti=0 [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
- nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+ nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+ ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
l1tf=off [X86]
auto (default)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index a1f3188c7be0..65bcd7f0cca1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
#include <linux/psci.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
this_cpu_safe = true;
}
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
if (!this_cpu_safe)
@@ -599,7 +603,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
}
/* forced off */
- if (__nospectre_v2) {
+ if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
__hardenbp_enab = false;
return false;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 6b7e1556460a..d826b17f7820 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -966,7 +967,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
{ /* sentinel */ }
};
- char const *str = "command line option";
+ char const *str = "kpti command line option";
bool meltdown_safe;
meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -988,6 +989,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
__kpti_forced = -1;
}
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+ str = "mitigations=off";
+ __kpti_forced = -1;
+ }
+
/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && kaslr_offset() > 0) {
if (!__kpti_forced) {
--
2.17.2
