If BPF JIT is on, there is no effective limit to prevent filling the entire module space with JITed e/BPF filters. For classic BPF filters attached with setsockopt SO_ATTACH_FILTER, there is no memlock rlimit check to limit the number of insertions like there is for the bpf syscall. This patch adds a per user rlimit for module space, as well as a system wide limit for BPF JIT. In a previously reviewed patchset, Jann Horn pointed out the problem that in some cases a user can get access to 65536 UIDs, so the effective limit cannot be set low enough to stop an attacker and be useful for the general case. A discussed alternative solution was a system wide limit for BPF JIT filters. This much more simply resolves the problem of exhaustion and de-randomizing in the case of non-CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON. If CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is on however, BPF insertions will fail if another user exhausts the BPF JIT limit. In this case a per user limit is still needed. If the subuid facility is disabled for normal users, this should still be ok because the higher limit will not be able to be worked around that way. The new BPF JIT limit can be set like this: echo 5000000 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit So I *think* this patchset should resolve that issue except for the configuration of CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON and subuid allowed for normal users. Better module space KASLR is another way to resolve the de-randomizing issue, and so then you would just be left with the BPF DOS in that configuration. Jann also pointed out how, with purposely fragmenting the module space, you could make the effective module space blockage area much larger. This is also somewhat un-resolved. The impact would depend on how big of a space you are trying to allocate. The limit has been lowered on x86_64 so that at least typical sized BPF filters cannot be blocked. If anyone with more experience with subuid/user namespaces has any suggestions I'd be glad to hear. On an Ubuntu machine it didn't seem like a un-privileged user could do this. I am going to keep working on this and see if I can find a better solution. Changes since v2: - System wide BPF JIT limit (discussion with Jann Horn) - Holding reference to user correctly (Jann) - Having arch versions of modulde_alloc (Dave Hansen, Jessica Yu) - Shrinking of default limits, to help prevent the limit being worked around with fragmentation (Jann) Changes since v1: - Plug in for non-x86 - Arch specific default values Rick Edgecombe (3): modules: Create arch versions of module alloc/free modules: Create rlimit for module space bpf: Add system wide BPF JIT limit arch/arm/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/nds32/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/nios2/kernel/module.c | 4 +- arch/parisc/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/unicore32/kernel/module.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 2 +- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/asm-generic/resource.h | 8 ++ include/linux/bpf.h | 7 ++ include/linux/filter.h | 1 + include/linux/sched/user.h | 4 + include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h | 3 +- kernel/bpf/core.c | 22 +++- kernel/bpf/inode.c | 16 +++ kernel/module.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 7 ++ 22 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1
