On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel > address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode > memory and elevate privileges. > > For example, it would mitigation this bug: > > - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 > > If the CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION option is enabled, an incorrect > state will result in a BUG_ON. I'm a bit confused about this choice of configurability. I can see two sensible choices: 1. Enable this hardening feature: BUG if there's an exploitable bug. 2. Don't enable it at all. While it's possible that silently papering over the bug is slightly faster than BUGging, it will allow bugs to continue to exist undetected. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-s390" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
