[PATCH] IB/core: Add mitigation for Spectre V1

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Some processors may mispredict an array bounds check and
speculatively access memory that they should not. With
a user supplied array index we like to play things safe
by masking the value with the array size before it is
used as an index.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@xxxxxxxxx>
---

[I don't have h/w, so just compile tested]

 drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c
index 9f8a48016b41..fdce254e4f65 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/semaphore.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -888,6 +889,7 @@ static int ib_umad_unreg_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, u32 __user *arg)
 	mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
 	mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
 
+	id = array_index_nospec(id, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS);
 	if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS || !__get_agent(file, id)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
-- 
2.20.1




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