On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 11:41:37AM -0400, Doug Ledford wrote: > On Wed, 2019-05-08 at 17:22 +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > > > It is a recommendation to choose a hard to predict memory > > > key (to make it hard for an attacker to guess it). From > > > RFC 5040, sec 8.1.1: > > > > > > An RNIC MUST choose the value of STags in a way difficult to > > > predict. It is RECOMMENDED to sparsely populate them over the > > > full available range. > > > > Nice, security by obscurity, this recommendation is nonsense in real life, > > protection should be done by separating PDs and not by hiding stags. > > That rather misses the point. The point isn't whether your PDs are > separate, but whether a malicious third party can easily guess your next > generated ID so it can be used in an attack. This is security by > obscurity, it's security by non-guessability, and it's been shown to be > necessary multiple times over in network stacks. ok > > -- > Doug Ledford <dledford@xxxxxxxxxx> > GPG KeyID: B826A3330E572FDD > Key fingerprint = AE6B 1BDA 122B 23B4 265B 1274 B826 A333 0E57 2FDD
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