On Tue, 2018-10-16 at 16:59 +0200, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential > spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index > ucm_cmd_table. > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Thanks, applied to for-rc. -- Doug Ledford <dledford@xxxxxxxxxx> GPG KeyID: B826A3330E572FDD Key fingerprint = AE6B 1BDA 122B 23B4 265B 1274 B826 A333 0E57 2FDD
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