On Fri, Jul 06, 2018 at 10:48:03PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied
> buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption
> (via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via
> sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace.
>
> In this case, the affected files are in debugfs (and should therefore only
> be accessible to root), and the read handlers check that *pos is zero
> (meaning that at least sys_splice() can't trigger kernel memory
> corruption). Because of the root requirement, this is not a security fix,
> but rather a cleanup.
>
> For the read handlers, fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of
> custom logic. Add min() calls to the write handlers.
>
> changed in v2:
> - also fix write handlers
>
> Fixes: 4a2da0b8c078 ("IB/mlx5: Add debug control parameters for congestion control")
> Fixes: e126ba97dba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters")
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cong.c | 9 +--------
> drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 32 ++++++++-----------------------
> 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
Applied to for-next
Thanks,
Jason
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