Re: [PATCH 00/24] InfiniBand Transport (IBTRS) and Network Block Device (IBNBD)

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On Thu, 2018-02-08 at 18:38 +0100, Danil Kipnis wrote:
> thanks for the link to the article. To the best of my understanding,
> the guys suggest to authenticate the devices first and only then
> authenticate the users who use the devices in order to get access to a
> corporate service. They also mention in the presentation the current
> trend of moving corporate services into the cloud. But I think this is
> not about the devices from which that cloud is build of. Isn't a cloud
> first build out of devices connected via IB and then users (and their
> devices) are provided access to the services of that cloud as a whole?
> If a malicious user already plugged his device into an IB switch of a
> cloud internal infrastructure, isn't it game over anyway? Can't he
> just take the hard drives instead of mapping them?

Hello Danil,

It seems like we each have been focussing on different aspects of the article.
The reason I referred to that article is because I read the following in
that article: "Unlike the conventional perimeter security model, BeyondCorp
doesn’t gate access to services and tools based on a user’s physical location
or the originating network [ ... ] The zero trust architecture spells trouble
for traditional attacks that rely on penetrating a tough perimeter to waltz
freely within an open internal network." Suppose e.g. that an organization
decides to use RoCE or iWARP for connectivity between block storage initiator
systems and block storage target systems and that it has a single company-
wide Ethernet network. If the target system does not restrict access based
on initiator IP address then any penetrator would be able to access all the
block devices exported by the target after a SoftRoCE or SoftiWARP initiator
driver has been loaded. If the target system however restricts access based
on the initiator IP address then that would make it harder for a penetrator
to access the exported block storage devices. Instead of just penetrating the
network access, IP address spoofing would have to be used or access would
have to be obtained to a system that has been granted access to the target
system.

Thanks,

Bart.


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