On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 03:24:15AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > As described in: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=822754 > > Attempting an RDS connection from the IP address of an IPoIB interface > to itself causes a kernel panic due to a BUG_ON() being triggered. > Making the test less strict allows rds-ping to work without crashing > the machine. > > A local unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the sytem. s/sytem/system > > I think this fix was written by Jay Fenlason <fenlason@xxxxxxxxxx>, > and extracted from the RedHat kernel patches here: > > https://oss.oracle.com/git/gitweb.cgi?p=redpatch.git;a=commitdiff;h=c7b6a0a1d8d636852be130fa15fa8be10d4704e8 > > This fix appears to have been carried by at least RedHat, Oracle, and > Ubuntu for several years. > > CVE-2012-2372 > > Reported-by: Honggang Li <honli@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > This is what I get for researching CVE lifetimes... > --- > net/rds/ib_send.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/net/rds/ib_send.c b/net/rds/ib_send.c > index 8557a1cae041..5fbf635d17cb 100644 > --- a/net/rds/ib_send.c > +++ b/net/rds/ib_send.c > @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int rds_ib_xmit(struct rds_connection *conn, struct rds_message *rm, > int flow_controlled = 0; > int nr_sig = 0; > > - BUG_ON(off % RDS_FRAG_SIZE); > + BUG_ON(!conn->c_loopback && off % RDS_FRAG_SIZE); > BUG_ON(hdr_off != 0 && hdr_off != sizeof(struct rds_header)); To be honest this function full of BUG_ONs and it looks fishy to have them there. Why don't we return EINVAL instead of crashing system? Thanks > > /* Do not send cong updates to IB loopback */ > -- > 2.7.4 > > > -- > Kees Cook > Pixel Security
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