From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Note on v7, it applies cleanly on Paul Moores' tree. 'git am' fails to apply patch 0002* to Dougs' tree, but 'patch' applies it without rejects. There's a new file that needs to be added before resolving the git am, drivers/infiniband/core/security.c Infiniband applications access HW from user-space -- traffic is generated directly by HW, bypassing the kernel. Consequently, Infiniband Partitions, which are associated directly with HW transport endpoints, are a natural choice for enforcing granular mandatory access control for Infiniband. QPs may only send or receives packets tagged with the corresponding partition key (PKey). The PKey is not a cryptographic key; it's a 16 bit number identifying the partition. Every Infiniband fabric is controlled by a central Subnet Manager (SM). The SM provisions the partitions by assigning each port with the partitions it can access. In addition, the SM tags each port with a subnet prefix, which identifies the subnet. Determining which users are allowed to access which partition keys on a given subnet forms an effective policy for isolating users on the fabric. Any application that attempts to send traffic on a given subnet is automatically subject to the policy, regardless of which device and port it uses. SM software configures the subnet through a privileged Subnet Management Interface (SMI), which is presented by each Infiniband port. Thus, the SMI must also be controlled to prevent unauthorized changes to fabric configuration and partitioning. To support access control for IB partitions and subnet management, security contexts must be provided for two new types of objects - PKeys and IB ports. A PKey label consists of a subnet prefix and a range of PKey values and is similar to the labeling mechanism for netports. Each Infiniband port can reside on a different subnet. So labeling the PKey values for specific subnet prefixes provides the user maximum flexibility, as PKey values may be determined independently for different subnets. There is a single access vector for PKeys called "access". An Infiniband port is labeled by device name and port number. There is a single access vector for IB ports called "manage_subnet". Because RDMA allows kernel bypass, enforcement must be done during connection setup. Communication over RDMA requires a send and receive queue, collectively known as a Queue Pair (QP). A QP must be initialized by privileged system calls before it can be used to send or receive data. During initialization the user must provide the PKey and port the QP will use; at this time access control can be enforced. Because there is a possibility that the enforcement settings or security policy can change, a means of notifying the ib_core module of such changes is required. To facilitate this a generic notification callback mechanism is added to the LSM. One callback is registered for checking the QP PKey associations when the policy changes. Mad agents also register a callback, they cache the permission to send and receive SMPs to avoid another per packet call to the LSM. Because frequent accesses to the same PKey's SID is expected a cache is implemented which is very similar to the netport cache. In order to properly enforce security when changes to the PKey table or security policy or enforcement occur ib_core must track which QPs are using which port, pkey index, and alternate path for every IB device. This makes operations that used to be atomic transactional. When modifying a QP, ib_core must associate it with the PKey index, port, and alternate path specified. If the QP was already associated with different settings, the QP is added to the new list prior to the modification. If the modify succeeds then the old listing is removed. If the modify fails the new listing is removed and the old listing remains unchanged. When destroying a QP the ib_qp structure is freed by the decive specific driver (i.e. mlx4_ib) if the 'destroy' is successful. This requires storing security related information in a separate structure. When a 'destroy' request is in process the ib_qp structure is in an undefined state so if there are changes to the security policy or PKey table, the security checks cannot reset the QP if it doesn't have permission for the new setting. If the 'destroy' fails, security for that QP must be enforced again and its status in the list is restored. If the 'destroy' succeeds the security info can be cleaned up and freed. There are a number of locks required to protect the QP security structure and the QP to device/port/pkey index lists. If multiple locks are required, the safe locking order is: QP security structure mutex first, followed by any list locks needed, which are sorted first by port followed by pkey index. --- v2: - Use void* blobs in the LSM hooks. Paul Moore - Make the policy change callback generic. Yuval Shaia, Paul Moore - Squash LSM changes into the patches where the calls are added. Paul Moore - Don't add new initial SIDs. Stephen Smalley - Squash MAD agent PKey and SMI patches and move logic to IB security. Dan Jurgens - Changed ib_end_port to ib_port. Paul Moore - Changed ib_port access vector from smp to manage_subnet. Paul Moore - Added pkey and ib_port details to the audit log. Paul Moore - See individual patches for more detail. v3: - ib_port -> ib_endport. Paul Moore - use notifier chains for LSM notifications. Paul Moore - reorder parameters in hooks to put security blob first. Paul Moore - Don't treat device name as untrusted string in audit log. Paul Moore v4: - Added separate AVC callback for LSM notifier. Paul Moore - Removed unneeded braces in ocontext_read. Paul Moore v5: - Fix link error when CONFIG_SECURITY is not set. Build Robot - Strip issue and Gerrit-Id: Leon Romanovsky v6: - Whitespace and bracket cleanup. James Morris - Cleanup error flow in sel_pkey_sid_slow. James Morris v7: - Rebased, minor conflicts in drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c and uverbs.c - Synchronized ocontext naming with userspace. - Exclude IB_QPT_RESERVED* qp types, in ib_security_modify_qp they are special QPs like GSI and SMI, and only used by the kernel. Daniel Jurgens (9): IB/core: IB cache enhancements to support Infiniband security IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooks selinux: Implement Infiniband PKey "Access" access vector selinux: Add IB Port SMP access vector selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs drivers/infiniband/core/Makefile | 3 +- drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c | 43 ++- drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h | 115 ++++++ drivers/infiniband/core/device.c | 86 +++++ drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c | 52 ++- drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 710 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c | 15 +- drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c | 27 +- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 15 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 35 ++ include/linux/security.h | 50 +++ include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 4 + include/rdma/ib_verbs.h | 49 +++ security/Kconfig | 9 + security/lsm_audit.c | 16 + security/security.c | 413 ++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 86 ++++- security/selinux/ibpkey.c | 245 ++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 + security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h | 31 ++ security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 7 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 2 + security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 112 +++++- security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 27 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 81 ++++ 27 files changed, 2207 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c create mode 100644 security/selinux/ibpkey.c create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-rdma" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
