On 5/3/2017 9:41 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Dan Jurgens <danielj@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Infiniband applications access HW from user-space -- traffic is generated
>> directly by HW, bypassing the kernel. Consequently, Infiniband Partitions,
>> which are associated directly with HW transport endpoints, are a natural
>> choice for enforcing granular mandatory access control for Infiniband. QPs may
>> only send or receives packets tagged with the corresponding partition key
>> (PKey). The PKey is not a cryptographic key; it's a 16 bit number identifying
>> the partition.
>>
>> Every Infiniband fabric is controlled by a central Subnet Manager (SM). The SM
>> provisions the partitions by assigning each port with the partitions it can
>> access. In addition, the SM tags each port with a subnet prefix, which
>> identifies the subnet. Determining which users are allowed to access which
>> partition keys on a given subnet forms an effective policy for isolating users
>> on the fabric. Any application that attempts to send traffic on a given subnet
>> is automatically subject to the policy, regardless of which device and port it
>> uses. SM software configures the subnet through a privileged Subnet Management
>> Interface (SMI), which is presented by each Infiniband port. Thus, the SMI must
>> also be controlled to prevent unauthorized changes to fabric configuration and
>> partitioning.
>>
>> To support access control for IB partitions and subnet management, security
>> contexts must be provided for two new types of objects - PKeys and IB ports.
>>
>> A PKey label consists of a subnet prefix and a range of PKey values and is
>> similar to the labeling mechanism for netports. Each Infiniband port can reside
>> on a different subnet. So labeling the PKey values for specific subnet prefixes
>> provides the user maximum flexibility, as PKey values may be determined
>> independently for different subnets. There is a single access vector for PKeys
>> called "access".
>>
>> An Infiniband port is labeled by device name and port number. There is a single
>> access vector for IB ports called "manage_subnet".
>>
>> Because RDMA allows kernel bypass, enforcement must be done during connection
>> setup. Communication over RDMA requires a send and receive queue, collectively
>> known as a Queue Pair (QP). A QP must be initialized by privileged system calls
>> before it can be used to send or receive data. During initialization the user
>> must provide the PKey and port the QP will use; at this time access control can
>> be enforced.
>>
>> Because there is a possibility that the enforcement settings or security
>> policy can change, a means of notifying the ib_core module of such changes
>> is required. To facilitate this a generic notification callback mechanism
>> is added to the LSM. One callback is registered for checking the QP PKey
>> associations when the policy changes. Mad agents also register a callback,
>> they cache the permission to send and receive SMPs to avoid another per
>> packet call to the LSM.
>>
>> Because frequent accesses to the same PKey's SID is expected a cache is
>> implemented which is very similar to the netport cache.
>>
>> In order to properly enforce security when changes to the PKey table or
>> security policy or enforcement occur ib_core must track which QPs are
>> using which port, pkey index, and alternate path for every IB device.
>> This makes operations that used to be atomic transactional.
>>
>> When modifying a QP, ib_core must associate it with the PKey index, port,
>> and alternate path specified. If the QP was already associated with
>> different settings, the QP is added to the new list prior to the
>> modification. If the modify succeeds then the old listing is removed. If
>> the modify fails the new listing is removed and the old listing remains
>> unchanged.
>>
>> When destroying a QP the ib_qp structure is freed by the decive specific
>> driver (i.e. mlx4_ib) if the 'destroy' is successful. This requires storing
>> security related information in a separate structure. When a 'destroy'
>> request is in process the ib_qp structure is in an undefined state so if
>> there are changes to the security policy or PKey table, the security checks
>> cannot reset the QP if it doesn't have permission for the new setting. If
>> the 'destroy' fails, security for that QP must be enforced again and its
>> status in the list is restored. If the 'destroy' succeeds the security info
>> can be cleaned up and freed.
>>
>> There are a number of locks required to protect the QP security structure
>> and the QP to device/port/pkey index lists. If multiple locks are required,
>> the safe locking order is: QP security structure mutex first, followed by
>> any list locks needed, which are sorted first by port followed by pkey
>> index.
> Hi Dan,
>
> I haven't heard anything from you in a while, where do things stand
> with this effort? Unless I missed them, I believe we are still
> waiting on the userspace, SELinux reference policy, and
> selinux-testsuite patches.
>
Hi Paul,
I got distracted for a while. I've just rebased the kernel and userspace. I'll do some testing and submit the userspace code in the next couple days. I still have to write the selinux-testsuite tests, I'll work on those concurrently with the userspace review cycle.
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