Re: [syzbot] [rdma?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in rdma_resolve_route

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在 2024/2/24 10:12, Zhu Yanjun 写道:
在 2024/2/23 18:51, syzbot 写道:
Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    2c3b09aac00d Add linux-next specific files for 20240214
git tree:       linux-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1793a064180000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=176d2dcbf8ba7017 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a2e2735f09ebb9d95bd1 compiler:       Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40

Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ac51042b61c6/disk-2c3b09aa.raw.xz vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/012344301c35/vmlinux-2c3b09aa.xz kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/cba3c3e5cd7c/bzImage-2c3b09aa.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+a2e2735f09ebb9d95bd1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in compare_netdev_and_ip drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:473 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cma_add_id_to_tree drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:513 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rdma_resolve_route+0x23f7/0x3150 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3379
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88808dcf6184 by task syz-executor.4/11929

I delved into the source code (cma.c), it seems that the spinlock id_table_lock protects id_priv as below when id_priv is used:

  468 static int compare_netdev_and_ip(int ifindex_a, struct sockaddr *sa,
  469                                  struct id_table_entry *entry_b)
  470 {
  471         struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = list_first_entry(
 472                 &entry_b->id_list, struct rdma_id_private, id_list_entry);
  473         int ifindex_b = id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr.bound_dev_if;
  474         struct sockaddr *sb = cma_dst_addr(id_priv);

But when id_priv is freed. No id_table_lock is used to protect id_priv as below.

2067 static void destroy_id_handler_unlock(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
2068         __releases(&idprv->handler_mutex)
2069 {
2070         enum rdma_cm_state state;
2071         unsigned long flags;
2072
2073         trace_cm_id_destroy(id_priv);
2074
2075         /*
2076          * Setting the state to destroyed under the handler mutex provides a 2077          * fence against calling handler callbacks. If this is invoked due to 2078          * the failure of a handler callback then it guarentees that no future
2079          * handlers will be called.
2080          */
2081         lockdep_assert_held(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
2082         spin_lock_irqsave(&id_priv->lock, flags);
2083         state = id_priv->state;
2084         id_priv->state = RDMA_CM_DESTROYING;
2085         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&id_priv->lock, flags);
2086         mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
2087         _destroy_id(id_priv, state);
2088 }

As such,  This causes id_priv to get out of sync.
So a dirty and quick solution should be:

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
index 1e2cd7c8716e..5cf034494898 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
@@ -2084,7 +2084,9 @@ static void destroy_id_handler_unlock(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
         id_priv->state = RDMA_CM_DESTROYING;
         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&id_priv->lock, flags);
         mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
+       spin_lock_irqsave(&id_table_lock, flags);
Please ignore.
id_table_lock is used in cma_remove_id_from_tree. This will cause spin lock embeded.

         _destroy_id(id_priv, state);
+       spin_unlock_irqrestore(&id_table_lock, flags);
  }

That is, the spinlock id_table_lock is used when id_priv is freed.

And in the function compare_netdev_and_ip, when id_priv is NULL, the function compare_netdev_and_ip returns directly.

RDMA stack is big and complicated. This is just my 2 cents. Please comment. Thanks a lot.

Zhu Yanjun


CPU: 1 PID: 11929 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-next-20240214-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
  print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
  kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
  compare_netdev_and_ip drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:473 [inline]
  cma_add_id_to_tree drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:513 [inline]
  rdma_resolve_route+0x23f7/0x3150 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3379
  ucma_resolve_route+0x1ba/0x330 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:745
  ucma_write+0x2df/0x430 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1743
  vfs_write+0x2a4/0xcb0 fs/read_write.c:588
  ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
  do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7f4eae47dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f4eaf2cd0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4eae5abf80 RCX: 00007f4eae47dda9
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000440 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f4eae4ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f4eae5abf80 R15: 00007fff93bb3dc8
  </TASK>

Allocated by task 11919:
  kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
  kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
  poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
  __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
  kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
  kmalloc_trace+0x1d9/0x360 mm/slub.c:4013
  kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline]
  kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
  __rdma_create_id+0x65/0x590 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:993
  rdma_create_user_id+0x83/0xc0 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:1049
  ucma_create_id+0x2d0/0x500 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:463
  ucma_write+0x2df/0x430 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1743
  vfs_write+0x2a4/0xcb0 fs/read_write.c:588
  ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
  do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

Freed by task 11915:
  kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
  kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
  kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:586
  poison_slab_object+0xa6/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:240
  __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
  kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
  slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2122 [inline]
  slab_free mm/slub.c:4296 [inline]
  kfree+0x14a/0x380 mm/slub.c:4406
  ucma_close_id drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:186 [inline]
  ucma_destroy_private_ctx+0x14e/0xc10 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:578
  ucma_close+0xfc/0x170 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1808
  __fput+0x429/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:411
  __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1557 [inline]
  __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1542 [inline]
  __x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1542
  do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808dcf6000
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 388 bytes inside of
  freed 2048-byte region [ffff88808dcf6000, ffff88808dcf6800)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0002373c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8dcf0 head:ffffea0002373c00 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0xfff80000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff80000000840 ffff888014c42000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 5149, tgid 5149 (kworker/1:4), ts 205905084555, free_ts 0
  set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
  post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
  prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
  get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
  __alloc_pages+0x256/0x6a0 mm/page_alloc.c:4567
  __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
  alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
  alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2191
  allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline]
  new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2407
  ___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3541
  __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3626 [inline]
  __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3679 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3851 [inline]
  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x2d4/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:4002
  kmalloc_reserve+0xf3/0x260 net/core/skbuff.c:582
  __alloc_skb+0x1b1/0x420 net/core/skbuff.c:651
  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
  alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc3/0x780 net/core/skbuff.c:6394
  sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x91a/0xa60 net/core/sock.c:2794
  sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1855 [inline]
  mld_newpack+0x1c3/0xa90 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1746
  add_grhead net/ipv6/mcast.c:1849 [inline]
  add_grec+0x1492/0x19a0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1987
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2113 [inline]
  mld_ifc_work+0x6bf/0xb30 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2650
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3146 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0x9d7/0x1730 kernel/workqueue.c:3226
  worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3307
page_owner free stack trace missing

Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff88808dcf6080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff88808dcf6100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88808dcf6180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                    ^
  ffff88808dcf6200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff88808dcf6280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================


---
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