On Mon, Jul 16, 2007 at 12:38:11AM +0200, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > > Or the user unplugs their flash drive after hibernation rather than before. > > > > Two things which I think would be nice to consider are: > > 1) Encryption - I'd actually prefer if my luks device did not > > remember the key accross a hibernation; I want to be forced to > > reenter the phrase. However I don't know what the best thing > > to do to partitions/applications using the luks device is. > > Encryption is possible with both the userland hibernation (aka uswsusp) and > TuxOnIce (formerly known as suspend2). Still, I don't consider it as a "must > have" feature for a framework to be generally useful (many users don't use it > anyway). If a user uses an encrypted filesystem, then he also needs an encrypted swap and encrypted hibernation image: Otherwise the fileystem encryption is not very useful. Forgetting the filesystem/swap decryption keys before hibernation is probably harder to do - there may be sensitive data in the kernel memory image that weren't cleared - even if the key itself is not there. In my opinion, encrypted hibernation is what every notebook user should want - that's the only way how to make sure data from the notebook aren't available when the notebook is physically stolen. -- Vojtech Pavlik Director SuSE Labs _______________________________________________ linux-pm mailing list linux-pm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-pm
