On Mon, 16 Jul 2007, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote:
On Sunday, 15 July 2007 14:58, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
* Rafael J. Wysocki (rjw@xxxxxxx) wrote:
(5) Hibernation should be transparent from the applications' point of view
Generally, applications should not notice that hibernation took place.
[Note that I don't regard all processes as applications and I think that
there may be processes which need to handle the hibernation in a special
way.] Ideally, for example, if some audio is being played when a
hibernation starts, the audio player should be able to continue playing the
same audio after the restore from the point in which it has been
interrupted by the hibernation. Also, the CPU affinities and similar
That would be _so_ embarrassing in a library; I'd rather the audio
player had the opportunity to consider whether restarting was a good idea.
(6) State of devices from before hibernation should be restored, if possible
If possible, during a restore devices should be brought back to the same
state in which they were before the corresponding hibernation. Of course
in some situations it might be impossible to do that (eg. the user
connected the hibernated system to a different IP subnet and then
restored), but as a general rule, we should do our best to restore the
state of devices, which is directly related to point (5) above.
Or the user unplugs their flash drive after hibernation rather than before.
Two things which I think would be nice to consider are:
1) Encryption - I'd actually prefer if my luks device did not
remember the key accross a hibernation; I want to be forced to
reenter the phrase. However I don't know what the best thing
to do to partitions/applications using the luks device is.
Encryption is possible with both the userland hibernation (aka uswsusp) and
TuxOnIce (formerly known as suspend2). Still, I don't consider it as a "must
have" feature for a framework to be generally useful (many users don't use it
anyway).
he's talking about the main system useing an encrypted device/partition,
not the hibernate image being stored encrypted.
This would require the main system 'forget' the keys when it does the
hinbernate and prompt for it again during the wake-up phase.
David Lang
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