During DPC error injection test we found there is race condition between pciehp and DPC driver, NULL pointer reference caused panic as following # setpci -s 64:02.0 0x196.w=000a // 64:02.0 is rootport has DPC capability # setpci -s 65:00.0 0x04.w=0544 // 65:00.0 is NVMe SSD populated in above port # mount /dev/nvme0n1p1 nvme (tested on stable 5.8 & ICS(Ice Lake SP platform, see https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/ice_lake_(server)) Buffer I/O error on dev nvme0n1p1, logical block 468843328, async page read BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000050 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 12 PID: 513 Comm: irq/124-pcie-dp Not tainted 5.8.0-0.0.7.el8.x86_64+ #1 RIP: 0010:report_error_detected.cold.4+0x7d/0xe6 Code: b6 d0 e8 e8 fe 11 00 e8 16 c5 fb ff be 06 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 d3 65 ff ff b8 06 00 00 00 e9 75 fc ff ff 48 8b 43 68 45 31 c9 <48> 8b 50 50 48 83 3a 00 41 0f 94 c1 45 31 c0 48 85 d2 41 0f 94 c0 RSP: 0018:ff8e06cf8762fda8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff4e3eaacf42a000 RCX: ff4e3eb31f223c01 RDX: ff4e3eaacf42a140 RSI: ff4e3eb31f223c00 RDI: ff4e3eaacf42a138 RBP: ff8e06cf8762fdd0 R08: 00000000000000bf R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000eb8ebeab53 R11: ffffffff93453258 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ff4e3eaacf42a130 R14: ff8e06cf8762fe2c R15: ff4e3eab44733828 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff4e3eab1fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000f8f80a004 CR4: 0000000000761ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ? report_normal_detected+0x20/0x20 report_frozen_detected+0x16/0x20 pci_walk_bus+0x75/0x90 ? dpc_irq+0x90/0x90 pcie_do_recovery+0x157/0x201 ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.47+0xe0/0xe0 dpc_handler+0x29/0x40 irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x60 irq_thread+0xea/0x170 ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x80/0x80 ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xf0/0xf0 kthread+0x124/0x140 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet......... CR2: 0000000000000050 Though we partly close the race condition with patch 'PCI: pciehp: check and wait port status out of DPC before handling DLLSC and PDC', but there is no hardware spec or software sequence to guarantee the pcie_ist() run into pci_wait_port_outdpc() first or DPC triggered status bits being set first when errors triggered DPC containment procedure, so device still could be removed by function pci_stop_and_removed_bus_device() then freed by pci_dev_put() in pciehp driver first during pcie_do_recover()/ pci_walk_bus() is called by dpc_handler() in DPC driver. Maybe unify pci_bus_sem and pci_rescan_remove_lock to serialize the removal and walking operation is the right way, but here we use pci_dev_get() to increase the reference count of device before using the device to avoid it is freed in use. With this patch and patch 'PCI: pciehp: check and wait port status out of DPC before handling DLLSC and PDC', stable 5.9-rc6 could pass the error injection test and no panic happened. Brute DPC error injection script: for i in {0..100} do setpci -s 64:02.0 0x196.w=000a setpci -s 65:00.0 0x04.w=0544 mount /dev/nvme0n1p1 /root/nvme sleep 1 done Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao@xxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Wen Jin <wen.jin@xxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Shanshan Zhang <ShanshanX.Zhang@xxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Changes: V2: revise doc according to Andy's suggestion. drivers/pci/pcie/err.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c index c543f419d8f9..e35c4480c86b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ static int report_error_detected(struct pci_dev *dev, pci_ers_result_t vote; const struct pci_error_handlers *err_handler; + if (!pci_dev_get(dev)) + return 0; device_lock(&dev->dev); if (!pci_dev_set_io_state(dev, state) || !dev->driver || @@ -76,6 +78,7 @@ static int report_error_detected(struct pci_dev *dev, pci_uevent_ers(dev, vote); *result = merge_result(*result, vote); device_unlock(&dev->dev); + pci_dev_put(dev); return 0; } @@ -94,6 +97,8 @@ static int report_mmio_enabled(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) pci_ers_result_t vote, *result = data; const struct pci_error_handlers *err_handler; + if (!pci_dev_get(dev)) + return 0; device_lock(&dev->dev); if (!dev->driver || !dev->driver->err_handler || @@ -105,6 +110,7 @@ static int report_mmio_enabled(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) *result = merge_result(*result, vote); out: device_unlock(&dev->dev); + pci_dev_put(dev); return 0; } @@ -113,6 +119,8 @@ static int report_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) pci_ers_result_t vote, *result = data; const struct pci_error_handlers *err_handler; + if (!pci_dev_get(dev)) + return 0; device_lock(&dev->dev); if (!dev->driver || !dev->driver->err_handler || @@ -124,6 +132,7 @@ static int report_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) *result = merge_result(*result, vote); out: device_unlock(&dev->dev); + pci_dev_put(dev); return 0; } @@ -131,6 +140,8 @@ static int report_resume(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) { const struct pci_error_handlers *err_handler; + if (!pci_dev_get(dev)) + return 0; device_lock(&dev->dev); if (!pci_dev_set_io_state(dev, pci_channel_io_normal) || !dev->driver || @@ -143,6 +154,7 @@ static int report_resume(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) out: pci_uevent_ers(dev, PCI_ERS_RESULT_RECOVERED); device_unlock(&dev->dev); + pci_dev_put(dev); return 0; } -- 2.18.4
