On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 04:48:07PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 01:42:09PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 12:02:57PM +0100, Giovanni Cabiddu wrote: > > > This patchset defines a blocklist of devices in the vfio-pci module and adds > > > the current generation of Intel(R) QuickAssist devices to it as they are > > > not designed to run in an untrusted environment. > > > > How can they not be safe? If any device is not safe to assign the > > whole vfio concept has major issues that we need to fix for real instead > > of coming up with quirk lists for specific IDs. > > No answer yet: how is this device able to bypass the IOMMU? Don't > we have a fundamental model flaw if a random device can bypass the > IOMMU protection? Except for an ATS bug I can't really think of a way > how a device could bypass the IOMMU, and in that case we should just > disable ATS. Apologies. This is specific to the QAT device and described in QATE-39220 in the QAT release notes: https://01.org/sites/default/files/downloads/336211-014-qatforlinux-releasenotes-hwv1.7_0.pdf If a request with an address outside of the IOMMU domain attached to the device is submitted, the device can lock up or induce a platform hang. Regards, -- Giovanni
