Hi Bjorn,
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 7:18 PM Rajat Jain <rajatja@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 12:13 PM Raj, Ashok <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Rajat,
> >
> >
> > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 02:26:18PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote:
> > > +ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx
> > > +lalithambika.krishnakumar@xxxxxxxxx
> > >
> > > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 8:19 AM Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > [+cc Christian (bolt maintainer), Alex, Joerg (IOMMU folks)]
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 04:07:10PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote:
> > > > > Hi,
> > > > >
> > > > > Currently, the PCI subsystem marks the PCI devices as "untrusted", if
> > > > > the firmware asks it to:
> > > > >
> > > > > 617654aae50e ("PCI / ACPI: Identify untrusted PCI devices")
> > > > > 9cb30a71acd4 ("PCI: OF: Support "external-facing" property")
> > > > >
> > > > > An "untrusted" device indicates a (likely external facing) device that
> > > > > may be malicious, and can trigger DMA attacks on the system. It may
> > > > > also try to exploit any vulnerabilities exposed by the driver, that
> > > > > may allow it to read/write unintended addresses in the host (e.g. if
> > > > > DMA buffers for the device, share memory pages with other driver data
> > > > > structures or code etc).
> > > > >
> > > > > High Level proposal
> > > > > ===============
> > > > > Currently, the "untrusted" device property is used as a hint to enable
> > > > > IOMMU restrictions (on Intel), disable ATS (on ARM) etc. We'd like to
> > > > > go a step further, and allow the administrator to build a list of
> > > > > whitelisted drivers for these "untrusted" devices. This whitelist of
> > > > > drivers are the ones that he trusts enough to have little or no
> > > > > vulnerabilities. (He may have built this list of whitelisted drivers
> > > > > by a combination of code analysis of drivers, or by extensive testing
> > > > > using PCIe fuzzing etc). We propose that the administrator be allowed
> > > > > to specify this list of whitelisted drivers to the kernel, and the PCI
> > > > > subsystem to impose this behavior:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1) The "untrusted" devices can bind to only "whitelisted drivers".
> > > > > 2) The other devices (i.e. dev->untrusted=0) can bind to any driver.
> > > > >
> > > > > Of course this behavior is to be imposed only if such a whitelist is
> > > > > provided by the administrator.
I haven't heard much on this proposal after the initial inputs (to
which I responded). Essentially, I agree that IO-MMU and ACS
restrictions need to be put in plcase. But I think we need this
additionally. Does this look acceptable to you? I wanted to start
spinning out the patches, but wanted to see if there are any pending
comments or concerns.
Thanks & Best Regards,
Rajat
> > > > >
> > > > > Details
> > > > > ======
> > > > >
> > > > > 1) A kernel argument ("pci.impose_driver_whitelisting") to enable
> > > > > imposing of whitelisting by PCI subsystem.
> > > > >
> > > > > 2) Add a flag ("whitelisted") in struct pci_driver to indicate whether
> > > > > the driver is whitelisted.
> >
> > I'm not sure if a driver certifying itself as secure is acceptable.
> >
> > Probably the pcie-component-authentication type mechanisms can establish
> > proper root of trust. Othewise we are just hand waving and any method
> > has its own gaps. You can probably say use the fuzzer etc, but that more
> > falls in every adminstrator needs to run and qualify every device. Once you
> > have a firmware update that component needs to be re-certified as well.
>
> Yes and No. Yes, the whitelist may have to be re-evaluated for any
> changes to kernel/drivers. But No, this will not be needed for any
> device firmware updates.
>
> >
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > 3) Use the driver's "whitelisted" flag and the device's "untrusted"
> > > > > flag, to make a decision about whether to bind or not in
> > > > > pci_bus_match() or similar.
> > > > >
> > > > > 4) A mechanism to allow the administrator to specify the whitelist of
> > > > > drivers. I think this needs more thought as there are multiple
> > > > > options.
> >
> > A default could be we:
> >
> > * Trust nothing - need to have a challenge to establish ROT.
> > * Trust RCiEP devices. These are integrated components and you can probably
> > think its not some FPGA plugged in trying to fake itself to defeat
> > security.
> > * A sysadm supplied list of devices to trust.
> > - This could be maybe a RP and all devices below. Since they might be
> > all internal facing, the sysadm put those things together. Not plugged
> > in external facing ports.
>
> Right, but the main problem that we want to solve (about the untrusted
> devices) still remains unaddressed.
>
> I believe that the approach taken by the paper you sent below, where
> we're building a root of trust using device certificates, key pairs,
> and challenges is definitely the right long term path. (Although I
> feel there is still scope of some attacks there, but let's not go
> there). But it requires the entire device ecosystem to come to an
> agreement and then move to that, and is a big change (requiring change
> in HW, FW and SW). That is still far away, and we need to think about
> what we can do to deal with the current set of (external) devices that
> we still want to support, and they can only plug in at untrusted
> ports.
>
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > a) Expose individual driver's "whitelisted" flag to userspace so a
> > > > > boot script can whitelist that driver. There are questions that still
> > > > > need answered though e.g. what to do about the devices that may have
> > > > > already been enumerated and rejected by then? What to do with the
> > > > > already bound devices, if the user changes a driver to remove it from
> > > > > the whitelist. etc.
> > > > >
> > > > > b) Provide a way to specify the whitelist via the kernel command
> > > > > line. Accept a ("pci.whitelist") kernel parameter which is a comma
> > > > > separated list of driver names (just like "module_blacklist"), and
> > > > > then use it to initialize each driver's "whitelisted" flag as the
> > > > > drivers are registered. Essentially this would mean that the whitelist
> > > > > of devices cannot be changed after boot.
> >
> > As @Jean suggested in other thread, maybe sysfs attribute to flip after
> > reboot is a good idea. One needs to be root, probably a good start. And
> > you don't need to reboot to fix.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > To me (b) looks a better option but I think a future requirement would
> > > > > be the ability to remove the drivers from the whitelist after boot
> > > > > (adding drivers to whitelist at runtime may not be that critical IMO)
> > > >
> > > > We definitely have some problems in this area.
> > > >
> > > > - Thunderbolt has similar security issues, and "bolt"
> > > > (https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/bolt/bolt) provides a user interface
> > > > for authorizing devices. Bolt is device-oriented (and specifically
> > > > for Thunderbolt), not driver-oriented, and I have no idea what
> > > > kernel interfaces it uses, but I wonder if there's some overlap with
> > > > this proposal. It seems like both bolt and this proposal could
> > > > ultimately be part of the same user interface.
> > >
> > > Thanks for pointing to it! My proposal does indeed stem from enabling
> > > of thunderbolt in our devices, and the PCIe tunneling (and thus the
> > > additional threat from external devices) that it brings along. I took
> > > a brief look at its documentation and it seems (Christian can correct
> > > me) that it identifies devices with "UUID" and then uses that to drive
> > > all its decisions. So essentially the problem it is trying to solve is
> > > determining whether or not to enable PCIe tunnels based on the UUID of
> > > the device. It seems to me that it assumes that the devices are
> > > trustworthy (i.e. for eg. they will not spoof any other whitelisted
> > > UUID). Christian, can you please help explain if bolt is capable of
> > > dealing with malicious devices that can spoof other devices in order
> > > to try and do bad things to the system?
> > >
> > > >
> > > > - ATS allows PCIe endpoints to cache address translations so they
> > > > can generate DMAs with translated addresses (TLP Address Type 10b,
> > > > see PCIe r5.0, sec 10.2.1). These DMAs can potentially bypass
> > > > the IOMMU.
> > > >
> > > > AFAICT, amd_iommu always turns on ATS when possible. It looks
> > > > like intel-iommu and arm-smmu-v3 turn it on except for "untrusted"
> > > > (external) devices.
> > >
> > > Correct. The point here is to turn on more restrictions on "untrusted" devices.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > There's nothing to prevent a malicious external device from
> > > > generating DMA with translated addresses even if we haven't
> > > > enabled ATS.
>
> Reading this mail again, I think I now finally understand what Bjorn
> was trying to say above, and I agree.
>
> >
> > @Bjorn: Intel Root ports behave as follows: at least for servers:
> >
> > Translation Requests: Are always non-posted. So RP will always respond with
> > UR if IOMMU.TRANSLATION_ENABLE=0
> >
> > Translated Requests can be non-posted (reads), or Posted (Writes).
> > If IOMMU.TE=0, RP will return UR for reads, and drop writes.
> >
>
> This is good info, thanks for confirming.
>
> >
> > *
> > > >
> > > > I think all three IOMMUs have mechanisms to block TLPs with
> > > > translated addresses, but I can't tell whether they all *use*
> > > > them.
> > >
> > > Understood.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > - ACS is an optional capability, but if implemented at all, downstream
> > > > ports (including root ports) are required to implement Translation
> > > > Blocking. When enabled, this blocks upstream memory requests with
> > > > non-default AT fields.
> > > >
> > > > Linux currently never enables Translation Blocking. Maybe the IOMMU
> > > > protection is sufficient, but I think we should consider enabling TB
> > > > by default and disabling it only when required to enable ATS. That
> > > > may catch malicious TLPs closer to the source and help when there is
> > > > no IOMMU at all.
>
> Agree. Additionally for untrusted ports, we should probably never
> disable TB and never allow to enable ATS.
>
> > >
> > > Understood and point taken. Note that enabling IOMMU protection (and
> > > even disabling ATS and enabling TB) is not enough though. This isn't
> > > to say that they shouldn't be done. Yes, they definitely need to be
> > > done. As these can help ensure that a device can generate transactions
> > > *only* to the memory areas (DMA buffers) that the driver has allotted
> > > to it, [and thus all the security mitigations (IOMMU/ ACS/AT/TB) have
> > > been configured so as to provide the device access for those areas].
> >
> > I'm not sure how much difference it makes if IOMMU's behave for translation
> > request and requests with AT=1 accordingly to ensure safety. What
> > additional protection does Translation blocking provides if we do not turn
> > on ATS for those untrusted devices.
>
> AFAICT nothing for Intel systems like you explained above. But maybe for others?
>
> >
> > >
> > > What these settings can't help with, though, is a malicious device
> > > trying to exploit certain driver vulnerabilities, that allow the
> > > device to do bad things even while *restricting transactions within
> > > the IOMMU allowed memory*. An attacker can do this by carefully
> > > looking at drivers to identify and exploit driver vulnerabilities
> > > (driver negligence). There is a lot of research work, but we for e.g.
> > > are looking at this:
> > > https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ndss2019_04A-1_Song_paper.pdf.
> > > Here are the examples of driver vulnerabilities that it found, that
> > > could be exploited even with the IOMMU/ACS and other restrictions in
> > > place (please check case studies in sections F/G/H in the above paper)
> > > since I may not be able to explain that well:
> > >
> > > * A driver could be double fetching the memory, causing it to do
> > > different things than intended. E.g.
> > > * A driver could be (negligently) passing some kernel addresses to the device.
> > > * A driver could be using (for memory dereferencing, for e.g.) the
> > > address/indices, given by the device, without enough validation.
> > > * A driver may negligently be sharing the DMA memory with some other
> > > driver data in the same PAGE. Since the IOMMU restrictions are PAGE
> > > granular, this might give device access to that driver data.
> > >
> > > I think the points I am trying to make here are that
> > >
> > > 1) Since malicious devices can spoof other (potentially whitelisted)
> > > devices, classifying devices into trusted and non-trusted is a good
> > > step, but it is not enough. We do need to go one step further and
> > > classify drivers into trusted/untrusted also, so as to (allow to)
> > > impose more restrictions.
> > >
> > > 2) Drivers can be vulnerable / exploitable; and finding, fixing, and
> > > introducing new exploits is a never ending cat and mouse game. But
> > > everyone's appetite for risk is different depending on use case, and
> > > thus administrators need a way to say, "I trust these drivers enough
> > > that I consider them safe for my use, even on untrusted ports".
> >
> > with efforts like lockdown kernel, you ensure the entire kernel and drivers
> > move to-gether.
>
> Thanks for pointing. That would be helpful, but I'm not sure if it
> will address the problems I identified above.
>
> > My fear is if we don't keep this security properties small
> > enough, the pure permutation and combinations would become a validation
> > nightmare that by itself can't ensure what works and what doesn't.
> >
> > >
> > > There is going to be a class of threat vectors that cannot be
> > > addressed by IOMMU and ACS alone. And my proposal aims at those cases
> > > specifically. It makes the case for an admin to actually look at the
> > > various drivers and use various techniques available (PCIe fuzzing,
> > > code analysis etc) to bless drivers. I once again suspect that I may
> > > have failed to elaborate on the threat vectors clearly. Please let me
> > > know if that is the case, and in that case, I'll probably ask our
> > > security folks to chime in.
> >
> > When you say "Admin should actually look at the various driver" what does
> > that mean? I think we should give a simple security policy enforcement
> > that is simple enough to keep up with. Until we get those device security
> > enhancements are placed in practice.
> >
> > https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/io/pci-express/pcie-device-security-enhancements-spec.html
>
> This I agree with, but until we get those enhanced secured devices in
> place, we need to build a solution for existing devices that can be
> plugged on untrusted ports. Since currently there isn't a way for us
> to verify device identity, any scheme that builds upon device provided
> identification, falls apart as soon as we introduce "device spoofing"
> in the threat model.
>
> The proposal allows a Linux distribution/system designer to choose
> which drivers he wants to allow on the untrusted ports. I think this
> is a fair ask - given that there isn't any other solution at this time
> to address the issues I pointed out.
>
>
> Thanks!
>
> Rajat
>
> PS; A dimension that I think I'd like to mention again are the issues
> arising out of "driver negligences" (like the vulnerabilities I
> pointed above). These may not necessarily require a malicious device.
> A driver whitelist also helps for that.
>
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Ashok
