On Tue, 21 Jun 2016 07:19:14 +0000 Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Why is the need for admin privileges not enough to make it safe? Seems like an opportunity for a phishing attempt, an exploited VM generates VFs and hopes that they get assigned to other VMs or put to other uses. It simply allows one VM to create resources that are really not tied to that VM and can easily be mis-used in other ways, potentially even with the assumption that it's secure. > What's the difference between the following? > 1. A PF is assigned to one user and the admin assigns one of it VFs to a different user. > 2. The admin assign the main network interface of the machine to a VM and bring down all the connectivity of the host. In case 1. does the admin realize what they've done? How? Maybe they just start filing bugs when they shutdown the PF assigned VM or even just reboot it and the VF assigned VM no longer has connectivity. A typical user might just think "hey cool, now I can assign PFs and VFs" w/o considering the implications of that. There are aspects of the host that we need to trust, allowing another VM to hold some of that trust is not such an obvious thing. Clearly in case 2. the admin is going to pretty quickly figure out that they've done something terribly wrong. > Indeed we don't address clean up, but we didn't see any adverse effect from the VFs remaining probed by the VFIO driver after the VM is shutdown. Yet that's clearly not the state the PF was in when assigned and those VFs have no cleanup mechanism. This is a big problem. > Would you be willing to accept this feature under some kconfig option or if it was allowed only for Privileged processes? > I would hate to throw this feature away just because we can't address every corner case. I'm not willing to accept half baked features and letting them bitrot under a config option that doesn't get regular use doesn't help. If this is really that useful to you then make it safe and predictable. I don't have answers to all the issues this generates, it might require extensions to driver APIs or new mechanisms for vfio to associate device ownership. There might be valid use cases for a user owned PF sourcing VFs owned by other users, but obviously to me it sounds like a rats nest of security issues and "because we can" and "useful development tool" are not resounding motives for me to sign up trying to support it. Thanks, Alex -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-pci" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
