Changes from v1: Due to the security concern raised in v1, we add two patches to make sure the VFs belong to the same IOMMU group as the PF and are probed by VFIO. Today the QEMU hypervisor allows assigning a physical device to a VM, facilitating driver development. However, it does not support enabling SR-IOV by the VM kernel driver. Our goal is to implement such support, allowing developers working on SR-IOV physical function drivers to work inside VMs as well. This patch series implements the kernel side of our solution. It extends the VFIO driver to support the PCIE SRIOV extended capability with following features: 1. The ability to probe SRIOV BAR sizes. 2. The ability to enable and disable sriov. This patch series is going to be used by QEMU to expose sriov capabilities to VM. We already have an early prototype based on Knut Omang's patches for SRIOV[1]. Open issues: 1. How to tell if it is safe to disable SRIOV? In the current implementation, a userspace can enable sriov, grab one of the VFs and then call disable sriov without releasing the device. This will result in a deadlock where the user process is stuck inside disable sriov waiting for itself to release the device. Killing the process leaves it in a zombie state. We also get a strange warning saying: [ 181.668492] WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 3684 at kernel/sched/core.c:7497 __might_sleep+0x77/0x80() [ 181.668502] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff810aa193>] prepare_to_wait_event+0x63/0xf0 2. How to expose the Supported Page Sizes and System Page Size registers in the SRIOV capability? Presently the hypervisor initializes Supported Page Sizes once and assumes it doesn't change therefore we cannot allow user space to change this register at will. The first solution that comes to mind is to expose a device that only supports the page size selected by the hypervisor. Unfourtently, Per SR-IOV spec section 3.3.12, PFs are required to support 4-KB, 8-KB, 64-KB, 256-KB, 1-MB, and 4-MB page sizes. We currently map both registers as virtualized and read only and leave user space to worry about this problem. 3. Other SRIOV capabilities. Do we want to hide capabilities we do not support in the SR-IOV Capabilities register? or leave it to the userspace application? [1] https://github.com/knuto/qemu/tree/sriov_patches_v6 Ilya Lesokhin (4): VFIO: Probe new devices in a live VFIO group with the VFIO driver IOMMU: Force the VFs of an untrusted PF device to be in the PFs IOMMU group PCI: Expose iov_set_numvfs and iov_resource_size for modules. VFIO: Add support for SRIOV extended capablity drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 4 + drivers/pci/iov.c | 4 +- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 3 + drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/vfio/vfio.c | 18 +++- include/linux/pci.h | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 1.8.3.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-pci" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
