On 06/18/2013 10:52 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 5:03 PM, Don Dutile<ddutile@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 06/18/2013 06:22 PM, Alex Williamson wrote:
On Tue, 2013-06-18 at 15:31 -0600, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 12:20 PM, Alex Williamson
<alex.williamson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, 2013-06-18 at 11:28 -0600, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:40:19PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
...
Who do you expect to decide whether to use this option? I think it
requires intimate knowledge of how the device works.
I think the benefit of using the option is that it makes assignment of
devices to guests more flexible, which will make it attractive to
users.
But most users have no way of knowing whether it's actually *safe* to
use this. So I worry that you're adding an easy way to pretend
isolation
exists when there's no good way of being confident that it actually
does.
...
I wonder if we should taint the kernel if this option is used (but not
for specific devices added to pci_dev_acs_enabled[]). It would also
be nice if pci_dev_specific_acs_enabled() gave some indication in
dmesg for the specific devices you're hoping to add to
pci_dev_acs_enabled[]. It's not an enumeration-time quirk right now,
so I'm not sure how we'd limit it to one message per device.
Right, setup vs use and getting single prints is a lot of extra code.
Tainting is troublesome for support, Don had some objections when I
suggested the same to him.
For RH GSS (Global Support Services), a 'taint' in the kernel printk means
RH doesn't support that system. The 'non-support' due to 'taint' being
printed
out in this case may be incorrect -- RH may support that use, at least until
a more sufficient patched kernel is provided.
Thus my dissension that 'taint' be output. WARN is ok. 'driver beware',
'unleashed dog afoot'.... sure...
So ... that's really a RH-specific support issue, and easily worked
around by RH adding a patch that turns off tainting.
sure. what's another patch to the thousands... :-/
It still sounds like a good idea to me for upstream, where use of this
option can very possibly lead to corruption or information leakage
between devices the user claimed were isolated, but in fact were not.
Bjorn
Did I miss something? This patch provides a user-level/chosen override;
like all other overrides, (pci=realloc, etc.), it can lead to a failing system.
IMO, this patch is no different. If you want to tag this patch with taint,
then let's audit all the (PCI) overrides and taint them appropriately.
Taint should be reserved to changes to the kernel that were done outside
the development of the kernel, or with the explicit intent to circumvent
the normal operation of the kernel. This patch provides a way to enable
ACS checking to succeed when the devices have not provided sufficiently complete
ACS information. i.e., it's a growth path for PCIe-ACS and its need for
proper support.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-pci" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-pci" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
