Jason Gunthorpe wrote: [..] > If the TVM would like to have the storage device do the encryption > with something like OPAL then: > - Attest and trust the PCI function, this lets you load the HBA driver > - Attest and trust the "media" > - Use the media attestation to load an encrypted copy of the media > key from the secure keyserver into the drive > > The split view of "media" and PCI function seems appropriate. The > keyserver should only release keys to media that has the correct > attested ID, while a controller may have many different media attached > to it. > > Attesting the controller is probably not enough to release the keys? Right, I think key release is going to be based on measurement of the entire VM and accepted device topology state. Also, if the storage volume itself is accessed through dm-{crypt,verity} it is not clear that the storage controller needs be attested to ensure confidentiality of those transfers.