Re: [RFC PATCH 1/5] PCI/CMA: Prepare to interoperate with TSM authentication

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On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 01:23:51AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> A TSM (TEE Security Manager) is a platform agent that facilitates TEE
> I/O (device assignment for confidential VMs). It uses PCI CMA, IDE, and
> TDISP to authenticate, encrypt/integrity-protect the link, and bind
> device-virtual-functions capable of accessing private memory to
> confidential VMs (TVMs).
> 
> Unlike native PCI CMA many of the details of establishing a connection
> between a device (DSM) and the TSM are abstracted through platform APIs.
> I.e. in the native case Linux picks the keys and validates the
> certificates, in the TSM case Linux just sees a "success" from invoking
> a "connect" API with the TSM.
> 
> SPDM only allows for one session-owner per transport (DOE), so the
> expectation is that authentication will only ever be in the "native"
> established case, or the "tsm" established case.

Holy cow, this is tasty nested acronym soup.  TEE, CMA, IDE, TDISP,
TVM, DSM, SPDM, DOE?  I know these will all become common knowledge in
a few years, but this is a big mouthful right now.  Is there any
overview or glossary in Documentation/ or similar?

Bjorn




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