Leon Romanovsky <leon@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 07:06:32PM +0200, Alexander Shishkin wrote: >> A malicious device can change its MSIX table size between the table >> ioremap() and subsequent accesses, resulting in a kernel page fault in >> pci_write_msg_msix(). >> >> To avoid this, cache the table size observed at the moment of table >> ioremap() and use the cached value. This, however, does not help drivers >> that peek at the PCIE_MSIX_FLAGS register directly. >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> --- >> drivers/pci/msi/api.c | 7 ++++++- >> drivers/pci/msi/msi.c | 2 +- >> include/linux/pci.h | 1 + >> 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > I'm not security expert here, but not sure that this protects from anything. > 1. Kernel relies on working and not-malicious HW. There are gazillion ways > to cause crashes other than changing MSI-X. This particular bug was preventing our fuzzing from going deeper into the code and reaching some more of the aforementioned gazillion bugs. > 2. Device can report large table size, kernel will cache it and > malicious device will reduce it back. It is not handled and will cause > to kernel crash too. How would that happen? If the device decides to have fewer vectors, they'll all still fit in the ioremapped MSIX table. The worst thing that can happen is 0xffffffff reads from the mmio space, which a device can do anyway. But that shouldn't trigger a page fault or otherwise crash. Or am I missing something? Thanks, -- Alex
