On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 03:37:18PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> IOMMUs, and possibly even fewer of them support VFIO, so I'm in full
> agreement with Greg and Christoph that this absolutely warrants being scoped
> per-bus. I mean, we literally already have infrastructure to prevent drivers
> binding if the IOMMU/DMA configuration is broken or not ready yet; why would
> we want a totally different mechanism to prevent driver binding when the
> only difference is that that configuration *is* ready and working to the
> point that someone's already claimed it for other purposes?
I see, that does make sense
I see these implementations:
drivers/amba/bus.c: .dma_configure = platform_dma_configure,
drivers/base/platform.c: .dma_configure = platform_dma_configure,
drivers/bus/fsl-mc/fsl-mc-bus.c: .dma_configure = fsl_mc_dma_configure,
drivers/pci/pci-driver.c: .dma_configure = pci_dma_configure,
drivers/gpu/host1x/bus.c: .dma_configure = host1x_dma_configure,
Other than host1x they all work with VFIO.
Also, there is no bus->dma_unconfigure() which would be needed to
restore the device as well.
So, would you rather see duplicated code into the 4 drivers, and a new
bus op to 'unconfigure dma'
Or, a 'dev_configure_dma()' function that is roughly:
if (dev->bus->dma_configure) {
ret = dev->bus->dma_configure(dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!drv->suppress_auto_claim_dma_owner) {
ret = iommu_device_set_dma_owner(dev, DMA_OWNER_KERNEL,
NULL);
if (ret)
ret;
}
}
And a pair'd undo.
This is nice because we can enforce dev->bus->dma_configure when doing
a user bind so everything holds together safely without relying on
each bus_type to properly implement security.
Jason
