On 2021-02-19 11:28 p.m., Krzysztof Wilczyński wrote:
> The "partition" member of the struct switchtec_ioctl_pff_port can be
> indirectly controlled from user-space through an IOCTL that the device
> driver provides enabling conversion between a PCI Function Framework
> (PFF) number and Switchtec logical port ID and partition number, thus
> allowing for command-line tooling [1] interact with the device from
> user-space.
>
> This can lead to potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 [2]
> vulnerability since the value of the partition is then used directly
> as an index to mmio_part_cfg_all of the struct switchtec_dev to retrieve
> configuration from Switchtec for a specific partition number.
>
> Fix this by sanitizing the value coming from user-space through the
> available IOCTL before it's then used as an index to mmio_part_cfg_all.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c:1118 ioctl_port_to_pff() warn:
> potential spectre issue 'stdev->mmio_part_cfg_all' [r] (local cap)
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [3].
>
> Related commit 46feb6b495f7 ("switchtec: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability").
>
> 1. https://github.com/Microsemi/switchtec-user/blob/master/lib/platform/linux.c
> 2. https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html
> 3. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAPcyv4gLKYiCtXsKFX2FY+rW93aRtQt9zB8hU1hMsj770m8gxQ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
>
> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kw@xxxxxxxxx>
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks!
Logan
