The prctl(PR_GET_NAME) and prctl(PR_SET_NAME) syscalls are used to set and
retrieve the process name. Those kernel functions are currently implemented to
always copy the full array of 16-bytes back and forth between kernel and
userspace instead of just copying the relevant bytes of the string.
This patch changes the prctl(PR_GET_NAME) to only copy back the null-terminated
string (with max. up to 16 chars including the trailing zero) to userspace and
thus avoids copying and leaking random trailing chars behind the process name.
Background:
The newest glibc testsuite includes a test which is implemented similiar to
this:
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, "thread name", 0, 0, 0);
char buffer[16] = { 0, };
prctl(PR_GET_NAME, buffer, 0, 0, 0);
char expected[16] = "thread name";
fail if memcmp(buffer, expected, 16) != 0;
The compiler may put the "thread name" string given in the PR_SET_NAME call
somewhere into memory and it's not guaranteed that trailing (up to a total of
16) chars behind that string has zeroes.
As such on the parisc architecture I've seen that the buffer[] array gets
filled on return of prctl(PR_GET_NAME) with such additional random bytes, e.g.:
"thread name\000@\032i\000"
74 68 72 65 61 64 20 6E 61 6D 65 00 40 1A 69 00
Unfortunatly the glibc testuite tests the full memory block of 16 bytes
and fails because it expects zeroed characters behind the process name.
In addition to fix the glibc testsuite, I suggest to fix the kernel function of
prctl(PR_GET_NAME) to just return the null-terminated process name.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@xxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ef1a78f5d71c..af71412760be 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
break;
case PR_GET_NAME:
get_task_comm(comm, me);
- if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
+ if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, strlen(comm) + 1))
return -EFAULT;
break;
case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
