On 07.02.2020 14:38, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: >> On 22.01.2020 17:25, Alexey Budankov wrote: >>> On 22.01.2020 17:07, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>> It keeps the implementation simple and readable. The implementation is more >>>>> performant in the sense of calling the API - one capable() call for CAP_PERFMON >>>>> privileged process. >>>>> >>>>> Yes, it bloats audit log for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged and unprivileged processes, >>>>> but this bloating also advertises and leverages using more secure CAP_PERFMON >>>>> based approach to use perf_event_open system call. >>>> >>>> I can live with that. We just need to document that when you see >>>> both a CAP_PERFMON and a CAP_SYS_ADMIN audit message for a process, >>>> try only allowing CAP_PERFMON first and see if that resolves the >>>> issue. We have a similar issue with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH versus >>>> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. >>> >>> perf security [1] document can be updated, at least, to align and document >>> this audit logging specifics. >> >> And I plan to update the document right after this patch set is accepted. >> Feel free to let me know of the places in the kernel docs that also >> require update w.r.t CAP_PERFMON extension. > > The documentation update wants be part of the patch set and not planned > to be done _after_ the patch set is merged. Well, accepted. It is going to make patches #11 and beyond. Thanks, Alexey > > Thanks, > > tglx >
