[PATCH] parisc: Ensure userspace privilege for ptraced processes in regset functions

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On parisc the privilege level of a process is stored in the lowest two bits of
the instruction pointers (IAOQ0 and IAOQ1). On Linux we use privilege level 0
for the kernel and privilege level 3 for user-space. So userspace should not be
allowed to modify IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 of a ptraced process to change it's privilege
level to e.g. 0 to try to gain kernel privileges.

This patch prevents such modifications in the regset support functions by
always setting the two lowest bits to one (which relates to privilege level 3
for user-space) if IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 are modified via ptrace regset calls.

Link: https://bugs.gentoo.org/481768
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@xxxxxx>

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index c60229075a33..4fa0d4c07521 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -502,7 +510,8 @@ static void set_reg(struct pt_regs *regs, int num, unsigned long val)
 			return;
 	case RI(iaoq[0]):
 	case RI(iaoq[1]):
-			regs->iaoq[num - RI(iaoq[0])] = val;
+			/* set 2 lowest bits to ensure userspace privilege: */
+			regs->iaoq[num - RI(iaoq[0])] = val | 3;
 			return;
 	case RI(sar):	regs->sar = val;
 			return;




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