On Wednesday 16 April 2008, Herbert Xu wrote: > > Minor cleanups to the OMAP RNG: > > Thanks. I've picked this up in cryptodev-2.6. Is that where the RNG stuff is now getting maintained? If so, I wonder what should be done with some other RNG changes sitting in one of my trees. Briefly, their initializations come late ... and after kernel code has already started to use the kernel pool. So attacks based on known RNG patterns are possible at that time. So the patch I had -- needs reworking -- moves the RNG driver initializations earlier, and uses the first one to seed the kernel pool. Cryptographically that would be no worse than the current situation (even if you don't wholly trust the RNG), and in most cases would be a distinct improvement. - Dave -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-omap" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
