On Tue, Aug 16, 2022 at 8:04 AM Al Viro wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 16, 2022 at 05:34:12AM +0900, Ryusuke Konishi wrote: > > > Yes, I agree it's better if security_inode_alloc() is moved to the end as > > possible in the sense of avoiding similar issues. > > But, would that vfs change be safe to backport to stable trees? > > Yes. > > > It looks like the error handling for security_inode_alloc() is in the > > middle of inode_init_always() for a very long time.. > > Look at the initializations done after it. The only thing with effects > outside of inode itself is (since 2010) an increment of nr_inodes. > > > If you want to see the impact of the vfs change, I think it's one way > > to apply this one in advance. Or if you want to fix it in one step, > > I think it's good too. How do you feel about this ? > > IMO that should go into inode_init_always(), with Cc:stable. If you > (or Dongliang Mu, or anybody else) would post such variant with > reasonable commit message, I'll pick it into vfs.git and feed to Linus > in the next window. E.g. into #work.inode, with that branch being > made never-rebased, so that you could pull it into your development > branch as soon as it's there... I agree with your thoughts on the course of action. Andrew, I withdraw this patch. Dongliang (or Jiacheng?), would it be possible for you to post a revised patch against inode_init_always() that moves the call of security_inode_alloc() instead of i_private initialization (as Al Viro said in a nearby thread [1]) ? If you have time, I would like to leave it to you since you wrote the original patch for inode_init_always(). [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAO4S-mficMz1mQW06EuCF+o11+mRDiCpufqVfoHkcRbQbs8kVw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Thanks, Ryusuke Konishi
