On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 10:52 PM <dai.ngo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> On 8/18/22 6:13 AM, Olga Kornievskaia wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 1:52 AM Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 08:19:54AM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> >>
> >>> NFS spec does not guarantee the safety of the server.
> >>> It's like saying that the Law makes Crime impossible.
> >>> The law needs to be enforced, so if server gets a request
> >>> to COPY from/to an fhandle that resolves as a non-regular file
> >>> (from a rogue or buggy NFS client) the server should return an
> >>> error and not continue to alloc_file_pseudo().
> >> FWIW, my preference would be to have alloc_file_pseudo() reject
> >> directory inodes if it ever gets such.
> >>
> >> I'm still not sure that my (and yours, apparently) interpretation
> >> of what Olga said is correct, though.
> > Would it be appropriate to do the following then:
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4file.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4file.c
> > index e88f6b18445e..112134b6438d 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4file.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4file.c
> > @@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ static struct file *__nfs42_ssc_open(struct
> > vfsmount *ss_mnt,
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > + if (S_ISDIR(fattr->mode)) {
> > + res = ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
>
> Can we also enhance nfsd4_do_async_copy to check for
> -EBADF and returns nfserr_wrong_type? perhaps adding
> an error mapping function to handle other errors also.
On the server side, if the open fails that's already translated into
the appropriate error -- err_off_load_denied.
>
> -Dai
>
> > res = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > len = strlen(SSC_READ_NAME_BODY) + 16;
> > read_name = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > @@ -357,6 +362,7 @@ static struct file *__nfs42_ssc_open(struct
> > vfsmount *ss_mnt,
> > r_ino->i_fop);
> > if (IS_ERR(filep)) {
> > res = ERR_CAST(filep);
> > + iput(r_ino);
> > goto out_free_name;
> > }
