Hi all!
Am 01.03.21 um 18:44 schrieb Chuck Lever:
>> On Mar 1, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bruce Fields <bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 01, 2021 at 03:20:24PM +0000, Chuck Lever wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Feb 26, 2021, at 6:04 PM, Daniel Kobras <kobras@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> If an auth module's accept op returns SVC_CLOSE, svc_process_common()
>>>> enters a call path that does not call svc_authorise() before leaving the
>>>> function, and thus leaks a reference on the auth module's refcount. Hence,
>>>> make sure calls to svc_authenticate() and svc_authorise() are paired for
>>>> all call paths, to make sure rpc auth modules can be unloaded.
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: 4d712ef1db05 ("svcauth_gss: Close connection when dropping an incoming message")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Kobras <kobras@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> Hi!
>>>>
>>>> While debugging NFS on a system with misconfigured krb5 settings, we noticed
>>>> a suspiciously high refcount on the auth_rpcgss module, despite all of its
>>>> consumers already unloaded. I wasn't able to analyze any further on the live
>>>> system, but had a look at the code afterwards, and found a path that seems
>>>> to leak references if the mechanism's accept() op shuts down a connection
>>>> early. Although I couldn't verify, this seem to be a plausible fix.
>>>>
>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>
>>>> Daniel
>>>
>>> Hi Daniel-
>>>
>>> I've provisionally included your patch in my NFSD for-rc topic branch
>>> here:
>>>
>>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux.git
>>>
>>> Your bug report seems plausible, but I need to take a closer look at that
>>> code and your proposed change. Would very much like to hear from others,
>>> too.
>>
>> So, the effect of this is to call svc_authorise more often. I think
>> that's always safe, because svc_authorise is a no-op unless rq_authops
>> is set, it clears rq_authops itself, and rq_authops being set is a
>> guarantee that ->accept() already ran.
>>
>> It's harder to know if this solves the problem, as I see a lot of other
>> mentions of THIS_MODULE in svcauth_gss.c.
>
> Perhaps a deeper audit is necessary.
>
> A small code change to inject SVC_CLOSE returns at random would enable
> a more dynamic analysis.
I've managed to come up with simple reproducer for this bug:
On a working krb5 NFS mount from a test client, check which enctype is
used in the ticket for the NFS service. Then unmount, and exclude this
enctype from permitted_enctypes in the server's /etc/krb5.conf.[*]
Trying to mount again from the test client should now fail (EPERM), and
each mount attempt increases the refcount of the server's auth_rpcgss
module (by 22 in my test).
Exchanging sunrpc.ko for a version with the patch applied, and
re-running the same test, the refcount remains constant instead. This
confirms the initial analysis, and indicates the fix is actually correct.
[*] For a quick test in a standard setup, I've used
[libdefaults]
permitted_enctypes = aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
(...)
to make the normal AES256 tickets fail. A more realistic scenario
would be a client that's restricted to RC4, and a server with
RC4 keys on the KDC, but only AES allowed in krb5.conf. Default
behaviour of typical AD join tools makes it easy to end up in a
situation like this.
>> Possibly orthogonal to this problem, but: svcauth_gss_release
>> unconditionally dereferences rqstp->rq_auth_data. Isn't that a NULL
>> dereference if the kmalloc at the start of svcauth_gss_accept() fails?
>>
>> Finally, should we care about module reference leaks?
>
> I would prefer that module reference counting work as expected. When it
> doesn't that tends to lead to people (say, me) hunting for bugs that
> might actually be serious.
The refcount leak is the easily visible consequence, but the skipped
call to svcauth_gss_release() probably also leaks a small amount of
memory for each request. Repeating the test case above for a longer
period of time (eg. by throwing an automounter into the mix), this might
eventually become noticeable.
>> Does anyone really *need* to unload modules?
>
> Anyone who wants to replace the module with a newer build that fixes a
> bug. It avoids a full reboot, and for some that's important.
Switching from rpc.svcgssd to gssproxy without taking down the machine
as a whole was the situation that originally prompted me to look into
this, but I admit that's a rather rare use case.
>> And will bad stuff happen when the
>> count overflows, or does the module code fail safely somehow in the
>> overflow case? I know, bugs are bugs, I should care about fixing all of
>> them, shame on me....
>>
>> --b.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> net/sunrpc/svc.c | 6 ++++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc.c b/net/sunrpc/svc.c
>>>> index 61fb8a18552c..d76dc9d95d16 100644
>>>> --- a/net/sunrpc/svc.c
>>>> +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc.c
>>>> @@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ svc_process_common(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct kvec *argv, struct kvec *resv)
>>>>
>>>> sendit:
>>>> if (svc_authorise(rqstp))
>>>> - goto close;
>>>> + goto close_xprt;
>>>> return 1; /* Caller can now send it */
>>>>
>>>> release_dropit:
>>>> @@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ svc_process_common(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct kvec *argv, struct kvec *resv)
>>>> return 0;
>>>>
>>>> close:
>>>> + svc_authorise(rqstp);
>>>> +close_xprt:
>>>> if (rqstp->rq_xprt && test_bit(XPT_TEMP, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_flags))
>>>> svc_close_xprt(rqstp->rq_xprt);
>>>> dprintk("svc: svc_process close\n");
>>>> @@ -1433,7 +1435,7 @@ svc_process_common(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct kvec *argv, struct kvec *resv)
>>>> err_short_len:
>>>> svc_printk(rqstp, "short len %zd, dropping request\n",
>>>> argv->iov_len);
>>>> - goto close;
>>>> + goto close_xprt;
>>>>
>>>> err_bad_rpc:
>>>> serv->sv_stats->rpcbadfmt++;
>>>> --
>>>> 2.25.1
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Puzzle ITC Deutschland GmbH
>>>> Sitz der Gesellschaft: Eisenbahnstraße 1, 72072
>>>> Tübingen
>>>>
>>>> Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Stuttgart HRB 765802
>>>> Geschäftsführer:
>>>> Lukas Kallies, Daniel Kobras, Mark Pröhl
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Chuck Lever
>
> --
> Chuck Lever
Kind regards,
Daniel
--
Daniel Kobras
Principal Architect
Puzzle ITC Deutschland
+49 7071 14316 0
www.puzzle-itc.de
--
Puzzle ITC Deutschland GmbH
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Eisenbahnstraße 1, 72072
Tübingen
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Stuttgart HRB 765802
Geschäftsführer:
Lukas Kallies, Daniel Kobras, Mark Pröhl
