I was under the impression that the best practice is to create something
along the lines of
/srv/nfs
and then bind mount everything you plan to export into that folder; e.g.
/etc/fstab:
/data2/xray /srv/nfs/xray none defaults,bind 0
Presumably this becomes a non-issue under these circumstances? Not sure
it's a good idea to attempt to accommodate every wacky use case someone
attempts to implement.
On 1/12/21 10:53 AM, Trond Myklebust wrote:
On Tue, 2021-01-12 at 10:32 -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 10:48:00PM +0800, 吴异 wrote:
Telling users how to configure the exported file system in the most
secure
way does
mitigate the problem to some extent, but this does not seem to
address the
security risks posed by no_ subtree_ check in the code. In my
opinion,when
the generated filehandle does not contain the inode information of
the
parent directory,the nfsd_acceptable function can also recursively
determine whether the request file exceeds the export path
dentry.Enabling
subtree_check to add parent directory information only brings some
troubles.
Filesystems don't necessarily provide us with an efficient way to
find
parent directories from any given file. (And note a single file may
have multiple parent directories.)
(I do wonder if we could do better in the directory case, though. We
already reconnect directories all the way back up to the root.)
I have a bold idea, why not directly remove the file handle
modification in
subtree_check, and then normalize the judgment of whether dentry
exceeds
the export point directory in nfsd_acceptable (line 38 to 54 in
/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c) .
As far as I understand it, the reason why subtree_check is not
turned on by
default is that it will cause problems when reading and writing
files,
rather than it wastes more time when nfsd_acceptable.
In short,I think it's open to question whether the security of the
system
depends on the user's complete correct configuration(the system
does not
prohibit the export of a subdirectory).
Enabling subtree_check to add parent directoryinformation only
brings
some troubles.
In short,I think it's open to question whether the security of the
system depends on the user's complete correct configuration(the
system
does not prohibit the export of a subdirectory).
I'd love to replace the export interface by one that prohibited
subdirectory exports (or at least made it more obvious where they're
being used.)
But given the interface we already have, that would be a disruptive
and
time-consuming change.
Another approach is to add more entropy to filehandles so they're
harder
to guess; see e.g.:
https://www.fsl.cs.stonybrook.edu/docs/nfscrack-tr/index.html
In the end none of these change the fact that a filehandle has an
infinite lifetime, so once it's leaked, there's nothing you can do.
The
authors suggest NFSv4 volatile filehandles as a solution to that
problem, but I don't think they've thought through the obstacles to
making volatile filehandles work.
--b.
The point is that there is no good solution to the 'I want to export a
subtree of a filesystem' problem, and so it is plainly wrong to try to
make a default of those solutions, which break the one sane case of
exporting the whole filesystem.
Just a reminder that we kicked out subtree_check not only because a
trivial rename of a file breaks the client's ability to perform I/O by
invalidating the filehandle. In addition, that option causes filehandle
aliasing (i.e. multiple filehandles pointing to the same file) which is
a major PITA for clients to try to manage for more or less the same
reason that it is a major PITA to try to manage these files using
paths.
The discussion on volatile filehandles in RFC5661 does try to address
some of the above issues, but ends up concluding that you need to
introduce POSIX-incompatible restrictions, such as trying to ban
renames and deletions of open files in order to make it work.
None of these compromises are necessary if you export a whole
filesystem (or a hierarchy of whole filesystems). That's the sane case.
That's the one that people should default to using.
