At the spring bakeathon, Chuck suggested that we should store the kerberos principal in addition to the client id string in nfsdcld. The idea is to prevent an illegitimate client from reclaiming another client's opens by supplying that client's id string. The first patch lays some groundwork for supporting multiple message versions for the nfsdcld upcalls, adding fields for version and message length to the nfsd4_client_tracking_ops (these fields are only used for the nfsdcld upcalls and ignored for the other tracking methods), as well as an upcall to get the maximum version supported by the userspace daemon. The second patch actually adds the v2 message, which adds the principal (actually just the first 1024 bytes) to the Cld_Create upcall and to the Cld_GraceStart downcall (which is what loads the data in the reclaim_str_hashtbl). I couldn't really figure out what the maximum length of a kerberos principal actually is (looking at krb5.h the length field in the struct krb5_data is an unsigned int, so I guess it can be pretty big). I don't think the principal will be that large in practice, and even if it is the first 1024 bytes should be sufficient for our purposes. Scott Mayhew (2): nfsd: add a "GetVersion" upcall for nfsdcld nfsd: add support for upcall version 2 fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 332 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 6 +- fs/nfsd/state.h | 3 +- include/uapi/linux/nfsd/cld.h | 37 +++- 4 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) -- 2.17.2
