Hi Trond-
> On Dec 10, 2018, at 11:30 AM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Kerberos v1 allows the selection of encryption types that are known
> to be insecure and are no longer widely deployed. Also there is no
> convenient facility for testing v1 or these enctypes, so essentially
> this code has been untested for some time.
>
> Note that RFC 6649 deprecates DES and Arcfour_56 in Kerberos, and
> RFC 8429 (October 2018) deprecates DES3 and Arcfour.
>
> Support for DES_CBC_RAW, DES_CBC_CRC, DES_CBC_MD4, DES_CBC_MD5,
> DES3_CBC_RAW, and ARCFOUR_HMAC encryption in the Linux kernel
> RPCSEC_GSS implementation is removed by this patch.
Wondering what kind of impact this will have on folks who have
the deprecated encryption types in their krb5.keytab or with a
KDC that might uses DES3 for user principals.
Anna suggested putting this change behind a KCONFIG option.
> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h | 39 ---
> include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h | 2
> net/sunrpc/Kconfig | 3
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile | 2
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 423 ------------------------------
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c | 53 ----
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 278 --------------------
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c | 73 -----
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c | 164 ------------
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 80 ------
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 254 ------------------
> 11 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1359 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h
> index 02c0412..57f4a49 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h
> @@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ struct krb5_ctx {
> struct crypto_sync_skcipher *acceptor_enc_aux;
> struct crypto_sync_skcipher *initiator_enc_aux;
> u8 Ksess[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN]; /* session key */
> - u8 cksum[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
> s32 endtime;
> atomic_t seq_send;
> atomic64_t seq_send64;
> @@ -235,11 +234,6 @@ enum seal_alg {
> + GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN)
>
> u32
> -make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
> - struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
> - unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout);
> -
> -u32
> make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *, char *header, int hdrlen,
> struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *key,
> unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksum);
> @@ -268,25 +262,6 @@ u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *, struct xdr_buf *,
> void *iv, void *in, void *out, int length);
>
> int
> -gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *outbuf,
> - int offset, struct page **pages);
> -
> -int
> -gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *inbuf,
> - int offset);
> -
> -s32
> -krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key,
> - int direction,
> - u32 seqnum, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf);
> -
> -s32
> -krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - unsigned char *cksum,
> - unsigned char *buf, int *direction, u32 *seqnum);
> -
> -int
> xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, unsigned int shiftlen);
>
> u32
> @@ -297,11 +272,6 @@ u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *, struct xdr_buf *,
> gfp_t gfp_mask);
>
> u32
> -gss_krb5_des3_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
> - struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
> - struct xdr_netobj *key);
> -
> -u32
> gss_krb5_aes_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
> struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
> struct xdr_netobj *key);
> @@ -316,14 +286,5 @@ u32 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *, struct xdr_buf *,
> struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *plainoffset,
> u32 *plainlen);
>
> -int
> -krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
> - unsigned char *cksum);
> -
> -int
> -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
> - s32 seqnum);
> void
> gss_krb5_make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen);
> diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h
> index ec6234e..7a8abcf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h
> @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
> /*
> * Dumb way to share this static piece of information with nfsd
> */
> -#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,23,3,1,2"
> +#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17"
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/Kconfig b/net/sunrpc/Kconfig
> index ac09ca8..80c8efc 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/Kconfig
> @@ -18,9 +18,8 @@ config SUNRPC_SWAP
> config RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5
> tristate "Secure RPC: Kerberos V mechanism"
> depends on SUNRPC && CRYPTO
> - depends on CRYPTO_MD5 && CRYPTO_DES && CRYPTO_CBC && CRYPTO_CTS
> + depends on CRYPTO_MD5 && CRYPTO_CTS
> depends on CRYPTO_ECB && CRYPTO_HMAC && CRYPTO_SHA1 && CRYPTO_AES
> - depends on CRYPTO_ARC4
> default y
> select SUNRPC_GSS
> help
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
> index c374268..b5a65a0 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
> @@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ auth_rpcgss-y := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \
> obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o
>
> rpcsec_gss_krb5-y := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \
> - gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o gss_krb5_keys.o
> + gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o gss_krb5_keys.o
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
> index 4f43383..896dd87 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
> @@ -138,230 +138,6 @@
> return crypto_ahash_update(req);
> }
>
> -static int
> -arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(unsigned int usage, u8 salt[4])
> -{
> - unsigned int ms_usage;
> -
> - switch (usage) {
> - case KG_USAGE_SIGN:
> - ms_usage = 15;
> - break;
> - case KG_USAGE_SEAL:
> - ms_usage = 13;
> - break;
> - default:
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> - salt[0] = (ms_usage >> 0) & 0xff;
> - salt[1] = (ms_usage >> 8) & 0xff;
> - salt[2] = (ms_usage >> 16) & 0xff;
> - salt[3] = (ms_usage >> 24) & 0xff;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static u32
> -make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
> - struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
> - unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
> -{
> - struct scatterlist sg[1];
> - int err = -1;
> - u8 *checksumdata;
> - u8 *rc4salt;
> - struct crypto_ahash *md5;
> - struct crypto_ahash *hmac_md5;
> - struct ahash_request *req;
> -
> - if (cksumkey == NULL)
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
> - dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
> - __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> - }
> -
> - rc4salt = kmalloc_array(4, sizeof(*rc4salt), GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!rc4salt)
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - if (arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(usage, rc4salt)) {
> - dprintk("%s: invalid usage value %u\n", __func__, usage);
> - goto out_free_rc4salt;
> - }
> -
> - checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!checksumdata)
> - goto out_free_rc4salt;
> -
> - md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> - if (IS_ERR(md5))
> - goto out_free_cksum;
> -
> - hmac_md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0,
> - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> - if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5))
> - goto out_free_md5;
> -
> - req = ahash_request_alloc(md5, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!req)
> - goto out_free_hmac_md5;
> -
> - ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
> -
> - err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - sg_init_one(sg, rc4salt, 4);
> - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, 4);
> - err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> -
> - sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
> - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
> - err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
> - checksummer, req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
> - err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> -
> - ahash_request_free(req);
> - req = ahash_request_alloc(hmac_md5, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!req)
> - goto out_free_hmac_md5;
> -
> - ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
> -
> - err = crypto_ahash_setkey(hmac_md5, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> -
> - sg_init_one(sg, checksumdata, crypto_ahash_digestsize(md5));
> - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, checksumdata,
> - crypto_ahash_digestsize(md5));
> - err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> -
> - memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
> - cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
> -out:
> - ahash_request_free(req);
> -out_free_hmac_md5:
> - crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5);
> -out_free_md5:
> - crypto_free_ahash(md5);
> -out_free_cksum:
> - kfree(checksumdata);
> -out_free_rc4salt:
> - kfree(rc4salt);
> - return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
> - * The checksum is performed over the first 8 bytes of the
> - * gss token header and then over the data body
> - */
> -u32
> -make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
> - struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
> - unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
> -{
> - struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
> - struct ahash_request *req;
> - struct scatterlist sg[1];
> - int err = -1;
> - u8 *checksumdata;
> - unsigned int checksumlen;
> -
> - if (kctx->gk5e->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR)
> - return make_checksum_hmac_md5(kctx, header, hdrlen,
> - body, body_offset,
> - cksumkey, usage, cksumout);
> -
> - if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
> - dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
> - __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> - }
> -
> - checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (checksumdata == NULL)
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> - if (IS_ERR(tfm))
> - goto out_free_cksum;
> -
> - req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!req)
> - goto out_free_ahash;
> -
> - ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
> -
> - checksumlen = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
> -
> - if (cksumkey != NULL) {
> - err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, cksumkey,
> - kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> - err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
> - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
> - err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
> - checksummer, req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
> - err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> -
> - switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
> - case CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5:
> - err = kctx->gk5e->encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, checksumdata,
> - checksumdata, checksumlen);
> - if (err)
> - goto out;
> - memcpy(cksumout->data,
> - checksumdata + checksumlen - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
> - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
> - break;
> - case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3:
> - memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
> - break;
> - default:
> - BUG();
> - break;
> - }
> - cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
> -out:
> - ahash_request_free(req);
> -out_free_ahash:
> - crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
> -out_free_cksum:
> - kfree(checksumdata);
> - return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
> -}
> -
> /*
> * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
> * Per rfc4121, sec. 4.2.4, the checksum is performed over the data
> @@ -526,35 +302,6 @@ struct encryptor_desc {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -int
> -gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
> - int offset, struct page **pages)
> -{
> - int ret;
> - struct encryptor_desc desc;
> - SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
> -
> - BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
> -
> - skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
> - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
> -
> - memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
> - desc.req = req;
> - desc.pos = offset;
> - desc.outbuf = buf;
> - desc.pages = pages;
> - desc.fragno = 0;
> - desc.fraglen = 0;
> -
> - sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4);
> - sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4);
> -
> - ret = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, encryptor, &desc);
> - skcipher_request_zero(req);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> struct decryptor_desc {
> u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
> struct skcipher_request *req;
> @@ -609,32 +356,6 @@ struct decryptor_desc {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -int
> -gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
> - int offset)
> -{
> - int ret;
> - struct decryptor_desc desc;
> - SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
> -
> - /* XXXJBF: */
> - BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
> -
> - skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
> - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
> -
> - memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
> - desc.req = req;
> - desc.fragno = 0;
> - desc.fraglen = 0;
> -
> - sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4);
> -
> - ret = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc);
> - skcipher_request_zero(req);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> /*
> * This function makes the assumption that it was ultimately called
> * from gss_wrap().
> @@ -942,147 +663,3 @@ struct decryptor_desc {
> ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
> return ret;
> }
> -
> -/*
> - * Compute Kseq given the initial session key and the checksum.
> - * Set the key of the given cipher.
> - */
> -int
> -krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
> - unsigned char *cksum)
> -{
> - struct crypto_shash *hmac;
> - struct shash_desc *desc;
> - u8 Kseq[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
> - u32 zeroconstant = 0;
> - int err;
> -
> - dprintk("%s: entered\n", __func__);
> -
> - hmac = crypto_alloc_shash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
> - dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n",
> - __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
> - return PTR_ERR(hmac);
> - }
> -
> - desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac),
> - GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!desc) {
> - dprintk("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n",
> - __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
> - crypto_free_shash(hmac);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - desc->tfm = hmac;
> - desc->flags = 0;
> -
> - /* Compute intermediate Kseq from session key */
> - err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, kctx->Ksess, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)&zeroconstant, 4, Kseq);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - /* Compute final Kseq from the checksum and intermediate Kseq */
> - err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cksum, 8, Kseq);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = 0;
> -
> -out_err:
> - kzfree(desc);
> - crypto_free_shash(hmac);
> - dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
> - return err;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Compute Kcrypt given the initial session key and the plaintext seqnum.
> - * Set the key of cipher kctx->enc.
> - */
> -int
> -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
> - s32 seqnum)
> -{
> - struct crypto_shash *hmac;
> - struct shash_desc *desc;
> - u8 Kcrypt[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
> - u8 zeroconstant[4] = {0};
> - u8 seqnumarray[4];
> - int err, i;
> -
> - dprintk("%s: entered, seqnum %u\n", __func__, seqnum);
> -
> - hmac = crypto_alloc_shash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
> - dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n",
> - __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
> - return PTR_ERR(hmac);
> - }
> -
> - desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac),
> - GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!desc) {
> - dprintk("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n",
> - __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
> - crypto_free_shash(hmac);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> -
> - desc->tfm = hmac;
> - desc->flags = 0;
> -
> - /* Compute intermediate Kcrypt from session key */
> - for (i = 0; i < kctx->gk5e->keylength; i++)
> - Kcrypt[i] = kctx->Ksess[i] ^ 0xf0;
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, zeroconstant, 4, Kcrypt);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - /* Compute final Kcrypt from the seqnum and intermediate Kcrypt */
> - err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - seqnumarray[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
> - seqnumarray[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
> - seqnumarray[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
> - seqnumarray[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff);
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, seqnumarray, 4, Kcrypt);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, Kcrypt,
> - kctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - err = 0;
> -
> -out_err:
> - kzfree(desc);
> - crypto_free_shash(hmac);
> - dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
> - return err;
> -}
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
> index 550fdf1..de327ae 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
> @@ -242,59 +242,6 @@ u32 krb5_derive_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
> return ret;
> }
>
> -#define smask(step) ((1<<step)-1)
> -#define pstep(x, step) (((x)&smask(step))^(((x)>>step)&smask(step)))
> -#define parity_char(x) pstep(pstep(pstep((x), 4), 2), 1)
> -
> -static void mit_des_fixup_key_parity(u8 key[8])
> -{
> - int i;
> - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
> - key[i] &= 0xfe;
> - key[i] |= 1^parity_char(key[i]);
> - }
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * This is the des3 key derivation postprocess function
> - */
> -u32 gss_krb5_des3_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
> - struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
> - struct xdr_netobj *key)
> -{
> - int i;
> - u32 ret = EINVAL;
> -
> - if (key->len != 24) {
> - dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len);
> - goto err_out;
> - }
> - if (randombits->len != 21) {
> - dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n",
> - __func__, randombits->len);
> - goto err_out;
> - }
> -
> - /* take the seven bytes, move them around into the top 7 bits of the
> - 8 key bytes, then compute the parity bits. Do this three times. */
> -
> - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
> - memcpy(key->data + i*8, randombits->data + i*7, 7);
> - key->data[i*8+7] = (((key->data[i*8]&1)<<1) |
> - ((key->data[i*8+1]&1)<<2) |
> - ((key->data[i*8+2]&1)<<3) |
> - ((key->data[i*8+3]&1)<<4) |
> - ((key->data[i*8+4]&1)<<5) |
> - ((key->data[i*8+5]&1)<<6) |
> - ((key->data[i*8+6]&1)<<7));
> -
> - mit_des_fixup_key_parity(key->data + i*8);
> - }
> - ret = 0;
> -err_out:
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> /*
> * This is the aes key derivation postprocess function
> */
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
> index eab71fc..0837543 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
> @@ -54,69 +54,6 @@
>
> static const struct gss_krb5_enctype supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[] = {
> /*
> - * DES (All DES enctypes are mapped to the same gss functionality)
> - */
> - {
> - .etype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW,
> - .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5,
> - .name = "des-cbc-crc",
> - .encrypt_name = "cbc(des)",
> - .cksum_name = "md5",
> - .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
> - .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
> - .mk_key = NULL,
> - .signalg = SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5,
> - .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_DES,
> - .keybytes = 7,
> - .keylength = 8,
> - .blocksize = 8,
> - .conflen = 8,
> - .cksumlength = 8,
> - .keyed_cksum = 0,
> - },
> - /*
> - * RC4-HMAC
> - */
> - {
> - .etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
> - .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR,
> - .name = "rc4-hmac",
> - .encrypt_name = "ecb(arc4)",
> - .cksum_name = "hmac(md5)",
> - .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
> - .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
> - .mk_key = NULL,
> - .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5,
> - .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4,
> - .keybytes = 16,
> - .keylength = 16,
> - .blocksize = 1,
> - .conflen = 8,
> - .cksumlength = 8,
> - .keyed_cksum = 1,
> - },
> - /*
> - * 3DES
> - */
> - {
> - .etype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
> - .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3,
> - .name = "des3-hmac-sha1",
> - .encrypt_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
> - .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)",
> - .encrypt = krb5_encrypt,
> - .decrypt = krb5_decrypt,
> - .mk_key = gss_krb5_des3_make_key,
> - .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD,
> - .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_DES3KD,
> - .keybytes = 21,
> - .keylength = 24,
> - .blocksize = 8,
> - .conflen = 8,
> - .cksumlength = 20,
> - .keyed_cksum = 1,
> - },
> - /*
> * AES128
> */
> {
> @@ -227,15 +164,6 @@
> if (IS_ERR(p))
> goto out_err;
>
> - switch (alg) {
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
> - /* Map all these key types to ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW */
> - alg = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW;
> - break;
> - }
> -
> if (!supported_gss_krb5_enctype(alg)) {
> printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported "
> "encryption key algorithm %d\n", alg);
> @@ -271,81 +199,6 @@
> return p;
> }
>
> -static int
> -gss_import_v1_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
> -{
> - u32 seq_send;
> - int tmp;
> -
> - p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->initiate, sizeof(ctx->initiate));
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - /* Old format supports only DES! Any other enctype uses new format */
> - ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW;
> -
> - ctx->gk5e = get_gss_krb5_enctype(ctx->enctype);
> - if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) {
> - p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> - goto out_err;
> - }
> -
> - /* The downcall format was designed before we completely understood
> - * the uses of the context fields; so it includes some stuff we
> - * just give some minimal sanity-checking, and some we ignore
> - * completely (like the next twenty bytes): */
> - if (unlikely(p + 20 > end || p + 20 < p)) {
> - p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> - goto out_err;
> - }
> - p += 20;
> - p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err;
> - if (tmp != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) {
> - p = ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
> - goto out_err;
> - }
> - p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err;
> - if (tmp != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
> - p = ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
> - goto out_err;
> - }
> - p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->endtime, sizeof(ctx->endtime));
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err;
> - p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &seq_send, sizeof(seq_send));
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err;
> - atomic_set(&ctx->seq_send, seq_send);
> - p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &ctx->mech_used);
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err;
> - p = get_key(p, end, ctx, &ctx->enc);
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err_free_mech;
> - p = get_key(p, end, ctx, &ctx->seq);
> - if (IS_ERR(p))
> - goto out_err_free_key1;
> - if (p != end) {
> - p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> - goto out_err_free_key2;
> - }
> -
> - return 0;
> -
> -out_err_free_key2:
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->seq);
> -out_err_free_key1:
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
> -out_err_free_mech:
> - kfree(ctx->mech_used.data);
> -out_err:
> - return PTR_ERR(p);
> -}
> -
> static struct crypto_sync_skcipher *
> context_v2_alloc_cipher(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, const char *cname, u8 *key)
> {
> @@ -377,124 +230,6 @@
> }
>
> static int
> -context_derive_keys_des3(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
> -{
> - struct xdr_netobj c, keyin, keyout;
> - u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH];
> - u32 err;
> -
> - c.len = GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH;
> - c.data = cdata;
> -
> - keyin.data = ctx->Ksess;
> - keyin.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
> - keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
> -
> - /* seq uses the raw key */
> - ctx->seq = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
> - ctx->Ksess);
> - if (ctx->seq == NULL)
> - goto out_err;
> -
> - ctx->enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
> - ctx->Ksess);
> - if (ctx->enc == NULL)
> - goto out_free_seq;
> -
> - /* derive cksum */
> - set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM);
> - keyout.data = ctx->cksum;
> - err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask);
> - if (err) {
> - dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving cksum key\n",
> - __func__, err);
> - goto out_free_enc;
> - }
> -
> - return 0;
> -
> -out_free_enc:
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
> -out_free_seq:
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->seq);
> -out_err:
> - return -EINVAL;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Note that RC4 depends on deriving keys using the sequence
> - * number or the checksum of a token. Therefore, the final keys
> - * cannot be calculated until the token is being constructed!
> - */
> -static int
> -context_derive_keys_rc4(struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
> -{
> - struct crypto_shash *hmac;
> - char sigkeyconstant[] = "signaturekey";
> - int slen = strlen(sigkeyconstant) + 1; /* include null terminator */
> - struct shash_desc *desc;
> - int err;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: %s: entered\n", __func__);
> - /*
> - * derive cksum (aka Ksign) key
> - */
> - hmac = crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(hmac)) {
> - dprintk("%s: error %ld allocating hash '%s'\n",
> - __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), ctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
> - err = PTR_ERR(hmac);
> - goto out_err;
> - }
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac, ctx->Ksess, ctx->gk5e->keylength);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err_free_hmac;
> -
> -
> - desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac), GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!desc) {
> - dprintk("%s: failed to allocate hash descriptor for '%s'\n",
> - __func__, ctx->gk5e->cksum_name);
> - err = -ENOMEM;
> - goto out_err_free_hmac;
> - }
> -
> - desc->tfm = hmac;
> - desc->flags = 0;
> -
> - err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sigkeyconstant, slen, ctx->cksum);
> - kzfree(desc);
> - if (err)
> - goto out_err_free_hmac;
> - /*
> - * allocate hash, and skciphers for data and seqnum encryption
> - */
> - ctx->enc = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(ctx->enc)) {
> - err = PTR_ERR(ctx->enc);
> - goto out_err_free_hmac;
> - }
> -
> - ctx->seq = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(ctx->seq)) {
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
> - err = PTR_ERR(ctx->seq);
> - goto out_err_free_hmac;
> - }
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: %s: returning success\n", __func__);
> -
> - err = 0;
> -
> -out_err_free_hmac:
> - crypto_free_shash(hmac);
> -out_err:
> - dprintk("RPC: %s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
> - return err;
> -}
> -
> -static int
> context_derive_keys_new(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
> {
> struct xdr_netobj c, keyin, keyout;
> @@ -635,9 +370,6 @@
> p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->enctype, sizeof(ctx->enctype));
> if (IS_ERR(p))
> goto out_err;
> - /* Map ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 to ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW */
> - if (ctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
> - ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW;
> ctx->gk5e = get_gss_krb5_enctype(ctx->enctype);
> if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) {
> dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported krb5 enctype %u\n",
> @@ -665,10 +397,6 @@
> ctx->mech_used.len = gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len;
>
> switch (ctx->enctype) {
> - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
> - return context_derive_keys_des3(ctx, gfp_mask);
> - case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
> - return context_derive_keys_rc4(ctx);
> case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> return context_derive_keys_new(ctx, gfp_mask);
> @@ -694,11 +422,7 @@
> if (ctx == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - if (len == 85)
> - ret = gss_import_v1_context(p, end, ctx);
> - else
> - ret = gss_import_v2_context(p, end, ctx, gfp_mask);
> -
> + ret = gss_import_v2_context(p, end, ctx, gfp_mask);
> if (ret == 0) {
> ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = ctx;
> if (endtime)
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
> index 48fe4a5..feb0f2a 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
> @@ -70,32 +70,6 @@
> #endif
>
> static void *
> -setup_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
> -{
> - u16 *ptr;
> - void *krb5_hdr;
> - int body_size = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
> -
> - token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, body_size);
> -
> - ptr = (u16 *)token->data;
> - g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, body_size, (unsigned char **)&ptr);
> -
> - /* ptr now at start of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
> - krb5_hdr = ptr;
> - *ptr++ = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
> - /*
> - * signalg is stored as if it were converted from LE to host endian, even
> - * though it's an opaque pair of bytes according to the RFC.
> - */
> - *ptr++ = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(ctx->gk5e->signalg);
> - *ptr++ = SEAL_ALG_NONE;
> - *ptr = 0xffff;
> -
> - return krb5_hdr;
> -}
> -
> -static void *
> setup_token_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
> {
> u16 *ptr;
> @@ -124,45 +98,6 @@
> }
>
> static u32
> -gss_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
> - struct xdr_netobj *token)
> -{
> - char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
> - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
> - .data = cksumdata};
> - void *ptr;
> - s32 now;
> - u32 seq_send;
> - u8 *cksumkey;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
> - BUG_ON(ctx == NULL);
> -
> - now = get_seconds();
> -
> - ptr = setup_token(ctx, token);
> -
> - if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
> - cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
> - else
> - cksumkey = NULL;
> -
> - if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, text, 0, cksumkey,
> - KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
> -
> - seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&ctx->seq_send);
> -
> - if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
> - seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> -}
> -
> -static u32
> gss_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
> struct xdr_netobj *token)
> {
> @@ -210,14 +145,10 @@
> struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
>
> switch (ctx->enctype) {
> - default:
> - BUG();
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
> - return gss_get_mic_v1(ctx, text, token);
> case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> return gss_get_mic_v2(ctx, text, token);
> + default:
> + return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> }
> }
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
> deleted file mode 100644
> index fb66562..0000000
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
> -/*
> - * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seqnum.c
> - *
> - * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/util_seqnum.c
> - *
> - * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
> - * All rights reserved.
> - *
> - * Andy Adamson <andros@xxxxxxxxx>
> - */
> -
> -/*
> - * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
> - *
> - * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
> - * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
> - * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
> - * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
> - * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
> - * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
> - * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
> - * representations about the suitability of this software for any
> - * purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
> - *
> - * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
> - * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
> - * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
> - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
> - * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
> - * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
> - * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
> - */
> -
> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> -#include <linux/types.h>
> -#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
> -
> -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
> -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
> -#endif
> -
> -static s32
> -krb5_make_rc4_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int direction, s32 seqnum,
> - unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf)
> -{
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
> - unsigned char plain[8];
> - s32 code;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: %s:\n", __func__);
> - cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(cipher))
> - return PTR_ERR(cipher);
> -
> - plain[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
> - plain[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
> - plain[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
> - plain[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff);
> - plain[4] = direction;
> - plain[5] = direction;
> - plain[6] = direction;
> - plain[7] = direction;
> -
> - code = krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(kctx, cipher, cksum);
> - if (code)
> - goto out;
> -
> - code = krb5_encrypt(cipher, cksum, plain, buf, 8);
> -out:
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
> - return code;
> -}
> -s32
> -krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key,
> - int direction,
> - u32 seqnum,
> - unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf)
> -{
> - unsigned char plain[8];
> -
> - if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)
> - return krb5_make_rc4_seq_num(kctx, direction, seqnum,
> - cksum, buf);
> -
> - plain[0] = (unsigned char) (seqnum & 0xff);
> - plain[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff);
> - plain[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff);
> - plain[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff);
> -
> - plain[4] = direction;
> - plain[5] = direction;
> - plain[6] = direction;
> - plain[7] = direction;
> -
> - return krb5_encrypt(key, cksum, plain, buf, 8);
> -}
> -
> -static s32
> -krb5_get_rc4_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum,
> - unsigned char *buf, int *direction, s32 *seqnum)
> -{
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
> - unsigned char plain[8];
> - s32 code;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: %s:\n", __func__);
> - cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(cipher))
> - return PTR_ERR(cipher);
> -
> - code = krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(kctx, cipher, cksum);
> - if (code)
> - goto out;
> -
> - code = krb5_decrypt(cipher, cksum, buf, plain, 8);
> - if (code)
> - goto out;
> -
> - if ((plain[4] != plain[5]) || (plain[4] != plain[6])
> - || (plain[4] != plain[7])) {
> - code = (s32)KG_BAD_SEQ;
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> - *direction = plain[4];
> -
> - *seqnum = ((plain[0] << 24) | (plain[1] << 16) |
> - (plain[2] << 8) | (plain[3]));
> -out:
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
> - return code;
> -}
> -
> -s32
> -krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
> - unsigned char *cksum,
> - unsigned char *buf,
> - int *direction, u32 *seqnum)
> -{
> - s32 code;
> - unsigned char plain[8];
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key = kctx->seq;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: krb5_get_seq_num:\n");
> -
> - if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)
> - return krb5_get_rc4_seq_num(kctx, cksum, buf,
> - direction, seqnum);
> -
> - if ((code = krb5_decrypt(key, cksum, buf, plain, 8)))
> - return code;
> -
> - if ((plain[4] != plain[5]) || (plain[4] != plain[6]) ||
> - (plain[4] != plain[7]))
> - return (s32)KG_BAD_SEQ;
> -
> - *direction = plain[4];
> -
> - *seqnum = ((plain[0]) |
> - (plain[1] << 8) | (plain[2] << 16) | (plain[3] << 24));
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
> index ef2b25b..f0f646a 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
> @@ -71,78 +71,6 @@
> * supposedly taken over. */
>
> static u32
> -gss_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
> - struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
> -{
> - int signalg;
> - int sealalg;
> - char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
> - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
> - .data = cksumdata};
> - s32 now;
> - int direction;
> - u32 seqnum;
> - unsigned char *ptr = (unsigned char *)read_token->data;
> - int bodysize;
> - u8 *cksumkey;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: krb5_read_token\n");
> -
> - if (g_verify_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
> - read_token->len))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
> - (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff)))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
> -
> - signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
> - if (signalg != ctx->gk5e->signalg)
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
> - if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE)
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
> - cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
> - else
> - cksumkey = NULL;
> -
> - if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0,
> - cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
> - ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
> - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
> -
> - /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
> -
> - now = get_seconds();
> -
> - if (now > ctx->endtime)
> - return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
> -
> - /* do sequencing checks */
> -
> - if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8,
> - &direction, &seqnum))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
> - (!ctx->initiate && direction != 0))
> - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
> -
> - return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> -}
> -
> -static u32
> gss_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
> struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
> {
> @@ -214,14 +142,10 @@
> struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
>
> switch (ctx->enctype) {
> - default:
> - BUG();
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
> - return gss_verify_mic_v1(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
> case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> return gss_verify_mic_v2(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
> + default:
> + return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> }
> }
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
> index 5cdde6c..98c99d3 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
> @@ -146,244 +146,6 @@
> }
> }
>
> -/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
> - * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace
> - * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */
> -/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface,
> - * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */
> -
> -/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */
> -
> -static u32
> -gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
> - struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
> -{
> - char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
> - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
> - .data = cksumdata};
> - int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
> - unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start;
> - s32 now;
> - int headlen;
> - struct page **tmp_pages;
> - u32 seq_send;
> - u8 *cksumkey;
> - u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
> -
> - now = get_seconds();
> -
> - blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
> - gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize);
> - BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize);
> - plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset;
> -
> - headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used,
> - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) -
> - (buf->len - offset);
> -
> - ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
> - /* shift data to make room for header. */
> - xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen);
> -
> - /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */
> - BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
> -
> - g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used,
> - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN +
> - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr);
> -
> -
> - /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
> - ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff);
> - ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff);
> -
> - msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
> -
> - /*
> - * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE
> - * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according
> - * to the RFC.
> - */
> - *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
> - *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
> - ptr[6] = 0xff;
> - ptr[7] = 0xff;
> -
> - gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen);
> -
> - if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
> - cksumkey = kctx->cksum;
> - else
> - cksumkey = NULL;
> -
> - /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
> - tmp_pages = buf->pages;
> - buf->pages = pages;
> - if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen,
> - cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> - buf->pages = tmp_pages;
> -
> - memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
> -
> - seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send);
> -
> - /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
> - * and encrypt at the same time: */
> - if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
> - seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
> - int err;
> - cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
> - 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(cipher))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seq_send);
> -
> - err = gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf,
> - offset + headlen - conflen, pages);
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
> - if (err)
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> - } else {
> - if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
> - offset + headlen - conflen, pages))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> - }
> -
> - return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> -}
> -
> -static u32
> -gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
> -{
> - int signalg;
> - int sealalg;
> - char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
> - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
> - .data = cksumdata};
> - s32 now;
> - int direction;
> - s32 seqnum;
> - unsigned char *ptr;
> - int bodysize;
> - void *data_start, *orig_start;
> - int data_len;
> - int blocksize;
> - u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen;
> - int crypt_offset;
> - u8 *cksumkey;
> -
> - dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
> -
> - ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
> - if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
> - buf->len - offset))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
> - (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff)))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
> -
> - /* get the sign and seal algorithms */
> -
> - signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
> - if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg)
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
> - if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg)
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - /*
> - * Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points
> - * to the beginning of the token header
> - */
> - crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) -
> - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base;
> -
> - /*
> - * Need plaintext seqnum to derive encryption key for arcfour-hmac
> - */
> - if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
> - ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum))
> - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
> -
> - if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
> - (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
> - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
> -
> - if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
> - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
> - int err;
> -
> - cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
> - 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(cipher))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seqnum);
> -
> - err = gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf, crypt_offset);
> - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
> - if (err)
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> - } else {
> - if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> - }
> -
> - if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
> - cksumkey = kctx->cksum;
> - else
> - cksumkey = NULL;
> -
> - if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset,
> - cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum))
> - return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> -
> - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
> - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
> - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
> -
> - /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
> -
> - now = get_seconds();
> -
> - if (now > kctx->endtime)
> - return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
> -
> - /* do sequencing checks */
> -
> - /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
> - * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
> -
> - blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
> - data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) +
> - conflen;
> - orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
> - data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
> - memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);
> - buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
> - buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start);
> -
> - if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
> - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> -
> - return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> -}
> -
> /*
> * We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need
> * to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports
> @@ -588,15 +350,11 @@ static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
> struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
>
> switch (kctx->enctype) {
> - default:
> - BUG();
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
> - return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
> case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
> + default:
> + return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> }
> }
>
> @@ -606,14 +364,10 @@ static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
> struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
>
> switch (kctx->enctype) {
> - default:
> - BUG();
> - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
> - case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
> - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf);
> case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
> return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf);
> + default:
> + return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> }
> }
>
--
Chuck Lever
