On Thu, Nov 08 2018, Chuck Lever wrote:
>
> Point taken, but having a single mempool for all RPC transports
> and users is also going to be a shared resource that can
> bottleneck.
Agreed.
mempools will only access the pre-allocated memory if a regular
kmalloc(GFP_NOWAIT) fails. I asked an mm developer about this once as
it seemed backwards, and he pointed out that kmalloc is much more
optimised than mempools. It often only accesses per-cpu resources,
which is much faster than taking a spinlock. Learning that helped me
understand some of this stuff better.
>
> I guess that's an argument in favor of building creds on demand
> rather than keeping them in a hash table, isn't it. :-)
I think it is. Thanks!!!
NeilBrown
>
>
>>> In addition, the comment near unx_marshal suggests we should
>>> cache the marshaled on-the-wire version of the credential instead
>>> of building it in the RPC Call buffer every time. That would
>>> require keeping the creds around.
>>
>> That comment has been there since 2.1.32 and has not be acted on. There
>> seems little reason to expect that to change. Caching doesn't seem to
>> have been found to be necessary in practice.
>>
>>>
>>> Have you measured a significant difference in throughput with
>>> this patch? Have you considered improving the lookup speed of
>>> the hash table by making the buckets into rb-trees, for example?
>>
>> No, I haven't measured.
>> I might have briefly considered changing to an rb-tree, but as the
>> current hashtable doesn't actually contain anything of value, I would
>> have quickly discarded the idea.
>>
>> If I wanted to further improve performance, I would look at ways to
>> bypass the "lookup_cred" step completely.
>> unx_marshal only needs the generic "struct cred", so there should be no
>> need to have a 'struct rpc_cred' at all.
>>
>> If this series is accepted, I'll (hopefully) look into seeing how
>> practical that is.
>>
>> Thanks again,
>> NeilBrown
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> As the lookup can happen during write-out, use a mempool
>>>> to ensure forward progress.
>>>> This means that we cannot compare two credentials for
>>>> equality by comparing the pointers, but we never do that anyway.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@xxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> net/sunrpc/auth.c | 1
>>>> net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c | 101 +++++++++++++++---------------------------------
>>>> 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth.c b/net/sunrpc/auth.c
>>>> index 867ea9834bde..a07a7c59d3a4 100644
>>>> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth.c
>>>> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth.c
>>>> @@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ rpcauth_init_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred, const struct auth_cred *acred,
>>>> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cred->cr_lru);
>>>> refcount_set(&cred->cr_count, 1);
>>>> cred->cr_auth = auth;
>>>> + cred->cr_flags = 0;
>>>> cred->cr_ops = ops;
>>>> cred->cr_expire = jiffies;
>>>> cred->cr_cred = get_cred(acred->cred);
>>>> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
>>>> index bff113a411e0..387f6b3ffbea 100644
>>>> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
>>>> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
>>>> @@ -11,16 +11,11 @@
>>>> #include <linux/types.h>
>>>> #include <linux/sched.h>
>>>> #include <linux/module.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/mempool.h>
>>>> #include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
>>>> #include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
>>>> #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>>>>
>>>> -struct unx_cred {
>>>> - struct rpc_cred uc_base;
>>>> - kgid_t uc_gid;
>>>> - kgid_t uc_gids[UNX_NGROUPS];
>>>> -};
>>>> -#define uc_uid uc_base.cr_uid
>>>>
>>>> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
>>>> # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
>>>> @@ -28,6 +23,7 @@ struct unx_cred {
>>>>
>>>> static struct rpc_auth unix_auth;
>>>> static const struct rpc_credops unix_credops;
>>>> +static mempool_t *unix_pool;
>>>>
>>>> static struct rpc_auth *
>>>> unx_create(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
>>>> @@ -42,15 +38,6 @@ static void
>>>> unx_destroy(struct rpc_auth *auth)
>>>> {
>>>> dprintk("RPC: destroying UNIX authenticator %p\n", auth);
>>>> - rpcauth_clear_credcache(auth->au_credcache);
>>>> -}
>>>> -
>>>> -static int
>>>> -unx_hash_cred(struct auth_cred *acred, unsigned int hashbits)
>>>> -{
>>>> - return hash_64(from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acred->cred->fsgid) |
>>>> - ((u64)from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acred->cred->fsuid) <<
>>>> - (sizeof(gid_t) * 8)), hashbits);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> @@ -59,53 +46,24 @@ unx_hash_cred(struct auth_cred *acred, unsigned int hashbits)
>>>> static struct rpc_cred *
>>>> unx_lookup_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags)
>>>> {
>>>> - return rpcauth_lookup_credcache(auth, acred, flags, GFP_NOFS);
>>>> -}
>>>> -
>>>> -static struct rpc_cred *
>>>> -unx_create_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
>>>> -{
>>>> - struct unx_cred *cred;
>>>> - unsigned int groups = 0;
>>>> - unsigned int i;
>>>> + struct rpc_cred *ret = mempool_alloc(unix_pool, GFP_NOFS);
>>>>
>>>> dprintk("RPC: allocating UNIX cred for uid %d gid %d\n",
>>>> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acred->cred->fsuid),
>>>> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acred->cred->fsgid));
>>>>
>>>> - if (!(cred = kmalloc(sizeof(*cred), gfp)))
>>>> - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>>> -
>>>> - rpcauth_init_cred(&cred->uc_base, acred, auth, &unix_credops);
>>>> - cred->uc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
>>>> -
>>>> - if (acred->cred && acred->cred->group_info != NULL)
>>>> - groups = acred->cred->group_info->ngroups;
>>>> - if (groups > UNX_NGROUPS)
>>>> - groups = UNX_NGROUPS;
>>>> -
>>>> - cred->uc_gid = acred->cred->fsgid;
>>>> - for (i = 0; i < groups; i++)
>>>> - cred->uc_gids[i] = acred->cred->group_info->gid[i];
>>>> - if (i < UNX_NGROUPS)
>>>> - cred->uc_gids[i] = INVALID_GID;
>>>> -
>>>> - return &cred->uc_base;
>>>> -}
>>>> -
>>>> -static void
>>>> -unx_free_cred(struct unx_cred *unx_cred)
>>>> -{
>>>> - dprintk("RPC: unx_free_cred %p\n", unx_cred);
>>>> - put_cred(unx_cred->uc_base.cr_cred);
>>>> - kfree(unx_cred);
>>>> + rpcauth_init_cred(ret, acred, auth, &unix_credops);
>>>> + ret->cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> static void
>>>> unx_free_cred_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
>>>> {
>>>> - struct unx_cred *unx_cred = container_of(head, struct unx_cred, uc_base.cr_rcu);
>>>> - unx_free_cred(unx_cred);
>>>> + struct rpc_cred *rpc_cred = container_of(head, struct rpc_cred, cr_rcu);
>>>> + dprintk("RPC: unx_free_cred %p\n", rpc_cred);
>>>> + put_cred(rpc_cred->cr_cred);
>>>> + mempool_free(rpc_cred, unix_pool);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> static void
>>>> @@ -115,30 +73,32 @@ unx_destroy_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> - * Match credentials against current process creds.
>>>> - * The root_override argument takes care of cases where the caller may
>>>> - * request root creds (e.g. for NFS swapping).
>>>> + * Match credentials against current the auth_cred.
>>>> */
>>>> static int
>>>> -unx_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *rcred, int flags)
>>>> +unx_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *cred, int flags)
>>>> {
>>>> - struct unx_cred *cred = container_of(rcred, struct unx_cred, uc_base);
>>>> unsigned int groups = 0;
>>>> unsigned int i;
>>>>
>>>> + if (cred->cr_cred == acred->cred)
>>>> + return 1;
>>>>
>>>> - if (!uid_eq(cred->uc_uid, acred->cred->fsuid) || !gid_eq(cred->uc_gid, acred->cred->fsgid))
>>>> + if (!uid_eq(cred->cr_cred->fsuid, acred->cred->fsuid) || !gid_eq(cred->cr_cred->fsgid, acred->cred->fsgid))
>>>> return 0;
>>>>
>>>> if (acred->cred && acred->cred->group_info != NULL)
>>>> groups = acred->cred->group_info->ngroups;
>>>> if (groups > UNX_NGROUPS)
>>>> groups = UNX_NGROUPS;
>>>> + if (cred->cr_cred->group_info == NULL)
>>>> + return groups == 0;
>>>> + if (groups != cred->cr_cred->group_info->ngroups)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> for (i = 0; i < groups ; i++)
>>>> - if (!gid_eq(cred->uc_gids[i], acred->cred->group_info->gid[i]))
>>>> + if (!gid_eq(cred->cr_cred->group_info->gid[i], acred->cred->group_info->gid[i]))
>>>> return 0;
>>>> - if (groups < UNX_NGROUPS && gid_valid(cred->uc_gids[groups]))
>>>> - return 0;
>>>> return 1;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> @@ -150,9 +110,10 @@ static __be32 *
>>>> unx_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
>>>> {
>>>> struct rpc_clnt *clnt = task->tk_client;
>>>> - struct unx_cred *cred = container_of(task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred, struct unx_cred, uc_base);
>>>> + struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
>>>> __be32 *base, *hold;
>>>> int i;
>>>> + struct group_info *gi = cred->cr_cred->group_info;
>>>>
>>>> *p++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_UNIX);
>>>> base = p++;
>>>> @@ -163,11 +124,12 @@ unx_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
>>>> */
>>>> p = xdr_encode_array(p, clnt->cl_nodename, clnt->cl_nodelen);
>>>>
>>>> - *p++ = htonl((u32) from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uc_uid));
>>>> - *p++ = htonl((u32) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->uc_gid));
>>>> + *p++ = htonl((u32) from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->cr_cred->fsuid));
>>>> + *p++ = htonl((u32) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->cr_cred->fsgid));
>>>> hold = p++;
>>>> - for (i = 0; i < UNX_NGROUPS && gid_valid(cred->uc_gids[i]); i++)
>>>> - *p++ = htonl((u32) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->uc_gids[i]));
>>>> + if (gi)
>>>> + for (i = 0; i < UNX_NGROUPS && i < gi->ngroups; i++)
>>>> + *p++ = htonl((u32) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gi->gid[i]));
>>>> *hold = htonl(p - hold - 1); /* gid array length */
>>>> *base = htonl((p - base - 1) << 2); /* cred length */
>>>>
>>>> @@ -214,12 +176,13 @@ unx_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
>>>>
>>>> int __init rpc_init_authunix(void)
>>>> {
>>>> - return rpcauth_init_credcache(&unix_auth);
>>>> + unix_pool = mempool_create_kmalloc_pool(16, sizeof(struct rpc_cred));
>>>> + return unix_pool ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> void rpc_destroy_authunix(void)
>>>> {
>>>> - rpcauth_destroy_credcache(&unix_auth);
>>>> + mempool_destroy(unix_pool);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = {
>>>> @@ -228,9 +191,7 @@ const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = {
>>>> .au_name = "UNIX",
>>>> .create = unx_create,
>>>> .destroy = unx_destroy,
>>>> - .hash_cred = unx_hash_cred,
>>>> .lookup_cred = unx_lookup_cred,
>>>> - .crcreate = unx_create_cred,
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> static
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Chuck Lever
>
> --
> Chuck Lever
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