On Thu, Oct 04 2018, David Howells wrote:
> NeilBrown <neilb@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> diff --git a/fs/afs/security.c b/fs/afs/security.c
>> index 81dfedb7879f..ac2e39de8bff 100644
>> --- a/fs/afs/security.c
>> +++ b/fs/afs/security.c
>> @@ -349,6 +349,16 @@ int afs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>> if (mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
>> return -ECHILD;
>>
>> + /* Short-circuit for owner */
>> + if (mask & MAY_ACT_AS_OWNER) {
>> + if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
>
> You don't know that inode->i_uid in meaningful. You may have noticed that
> afs_permission() ignores i_uid and i_gid entirely. It queries the server (if
> this information is not otherwise cached) to ask what permits the user is
> granted - where the user identity is defined by the key returned from
> afs_request_key()[*].
>
> So, NAK for the afs piece.
Thanks for the review.
As afs doesn't use the generic xattr code and doesn't call
setattr_prepare(), this is all largely irrelevant for afs.
afs_permission() will probably only get MAY_ACT_AS_OWNER passed when
someone uses fcntl(F_SETFL) to set the O_NOATIME flag.
Currently a permission test based on UID is performed which, as you say,
is wrong. My patch simply preserved this current (wrong) behaviour.
Shall I change it to always allow access, like with NFS?
Probably O_NOATIME is ignored, in which case f_op->check_flags should
probably report -EINVAL (???) ... or might that cause a regression?
Thanks,
NeilBrown
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
