On Fri, Jun 1, 2018 at 4:26 PM, bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx <bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 04:00:22PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 1, 2018 at 3:50 PM, bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx >> <bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 03:32:59PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: >> >> How do you define "safely"? >> >> >> >> Is it safe for root to do >> >> >> >> cp -a /nfs/remotedir /tmp/localdir >> >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> That's essentially what an overlayfs mount with an NFS layer does with >> >> respect to access permissions: >> >> >> >> - remote files are not modifiable to anyone, unless server allows >> >> >> >> - remote files *readable to root* will provide access based on local DAC check. >> >> >> >> Does that need to be made clear in the docs? Surely. But it does NOT >> >> mean it's dangerous or that it's not useful with an arbitrary NFS >> >> server >> > >> > We should definitely have clear documentation, but despite that, in >> > practice lots of people *will* be surprised when permissions are >> > enforced differently after copy-up, and those surprises may well have >> > unpleasant implications. >> >> Permissions are enforced exactly the same before and after copy-up. >> That's one of the good points in doing the permission checks locally. > > Whoops, sorry, I missed that. So you always read owners and mode bits > out of the cached inode and used those to check permissions instead of > calling access? > > That still sounds pretty confusing. E.g. if the server's squashing root > to a user without permission to read a file, you'll pass local > permission checks, but the success a given read may actually depend on > whether the data's already cached? You have a point there. I think current code can be inconsistent like that. But that's only because it doesn't stack file operations. Stacking f_ops is now queued up for 4.18, which means that *all* calls into underlying layers should be with the same creds (those of the mounting task), regardless of the creds of the task performing the operation. So if NFS server is denying read to mounter (because of root squashing or for other reason), then that file will not be accessible from overlayfs by anyone and will not be in the cache either. If access to mounter is allowed, then the access will be based on local DAC. Look at ovl_permission(), I think it pretty clearly describes this model. Thanks, Miklos -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
