On Sat, Dec 26, 2015 at 9:28 PM, Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Sat, Dec 26, 2015 at 08:26:13PM -0500, Trond Myklebust wrote: > >> The may_open() is now happening before NFS gets a chance to issue the >> OPEN rpc call, which is a change w.r.t. the lookup intent code. The >> ordering is significant because it means the OPEN can no longer prime >> the access cache. > > Always had... Consider e.g. device nodes; there ->open() might very well > have side effects, and ones you do not want to allow for any random caller. > Permissions checks always had been done prior to ->open(), it's not something > new. When we did lookup intents, the d_revalidate() would take a lookup intent, which would trigger the OPEN call for NFS before we got anywhere near permissions checking. As I said, the removal of lookup intents makes that impossible, and hence now we have the inefficiency. > >> >> > Merry Christmas >> >> >> >> Suggestions Al? >> > >> > Make nfs_permission() relax the checks when it sees MAY_OPEN, if you know >> > that things will be caught by server anyway? >> >> That can work as long as we're guaranteed that everything that calls >> inode_permission() with MAY_OPEN on a regular file will also follow up >> with a vfs_open() or dentry_open() on success. Is this always the >> case? > > 1) in do_tmpfile(), followed by do_dentry_open() (not reachable by NFS since > it doesn't have ->tmpfile() instance anyway) > > 2) in atomic_open(), after the call of ->atomic_open() has succeeded. Right, so we don't care there either. > 3) in do_last(), followed on success by vfs_open() > > That's all. All calls of inode_permission() that get MAY_OPEN come from > may_open(), and there's no other callers of that puppy. OK. > PS: I'm not sure we want to carry that MAY_OPEN in op->acc_mode, actually. > may_open() gets acc_mode without MAY_OPEN only when called from do_last() > in case of O_PATH open. The check in the very beginning of may_open() > triggers only in that case and might as well be replaced with > if (likely(!(open_flag & O_PATH))) { > error = may_open(&nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag); > if (error) > goto out; > } > in that call site (one right after finish_open_created:). Then we could > bloody well have may_open() do > error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode | MAY_OPEN); > and forget about MAY_OPEN in op->acc_mode. > > Something like the patch below should be an equivalent transformation and with > that it's really clear what's going on with MAY_OPEN. Warning: completely > untested. That looks right and would indeed make it easier to trace. I'll push the changes to nfs_permission() Thanks! Trond -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html