On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote:
> On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote:
> >> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression
> >> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if:
> >>
> >> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default)
> >> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials
> >>
> >> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use
> >> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted
> >> for not having run kinit.
> >>
> >> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity
> >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME.
> >>
> >> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity
> >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall
> >> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case.
> >>
> >> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers -
> >> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the
> >> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for
> >> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on
> >> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the
> >> filesystem's auth flavor.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >>
> >> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch
> >>
> >> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> >> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> >> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644
> >> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> >> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> >> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out:
> >> */
> >> static int
> >> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
> >> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors)
> >> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info,
> >> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity)
> >> {
> >> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = {
> >> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH,
> >> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
> >> .rpc_argp = &args,
> >> .rpc_resp = &res,
> >> };
> >> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg,
> >> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
> >> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client;
> >> + int status;
> >> +
> >> + if (use_integrity) {
> >> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient;
> >> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client);
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
> >> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args,
> >> + &res.seq_res, 0);
> >> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
> >> +
> >> + if (msg.rpc_cred)
> >> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred);
> >> +
> >> + return status;
> >> }
> >>
> >> static int
> >> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
> >> struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
> >> int err;
> >> do {
> >> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors);
> >> + /* first try using integrity protection */
> >> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC;
> >> +
> >> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */
> >> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client))
> >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
> >> + flavors, true);
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with
> >> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is
> >> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use
> >> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred.
> >> + */
> >> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC)
> >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
> >> + flavors, false);
> >
> > As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning
> > NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to
> >
> > if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected())
> > err = ….
>
> Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple.
>
> If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc).
Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here?
--
Trond Myklebust
Linux NFS client maintainer
NetApp
Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx
www.netapp.com
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