Re: [PATCH] Avoid PTR lookups when possible

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Tue, 2013-04-02 at 14:39 -0400, Jim Rees wrote:
> Simo Sorce wrote:
> 
>   No this is not what I am saying.
>   The client uses the fully qualified name at the mount command but due to
>   the use of a PTR lookup it is fooled into acquiring a ticket for the
>   wrong server which will then happily allow you to connect.
>   
>   Currently:
>   The mount command tells the kernel both the server name
>   'secure.server.name' and it's IP address 1.2.3.4 however rpc.gssd
>   currently completely ignored the server name passed in by the mount
>   command (see the 'dummy' variable) and instead uses the ip address to do
>   a reverse lookup.
>   
>   PTR lookup of 1.2.3.4 --- MITM ---> public.server.com
>   
>   Then it uses the retrieved name (public..) to construct the GSSAPI name
>   it wants to connect to, the result is that the name
>   nfs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx is constructed instead of the requested
>   nfs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx that should be requested.
>   
>   So the client does ask for the right server but can be easily tricked
>   into connecting to another one.
>   
>   Kerberos itself *is* correctly identifying the server, it's rpc.gssd
>   that opened it'sself to being fooled before involving Kerberos.
> 
> Ok, I think I understand now. I suggest adding some of that text into the
> commit log.

To be honest this is a well known problem in the kerberos community, I
will see if I can find a public text that references this problem and
add a link to it in the commit log ?

It's a bit of a long explanation otherwise ... maybe I can point at this
thread in the archives ?

>  And stop using the term "mitm". A mitm attack is used to
> convince both ends of a connection that they are talking to each other. DNS
> is not a mutually authenticated exchange.

Well it is still a sort of Man in the Middle, as you also have to
redirect communications (nfsv4 uses TCP) for it to be effective, it is
just not exploiting a crypto issue.

> This discussion is making me nervous. It makes me think no one has thought
> through the use of kerberos to authenticate nfs connections on linux.

I think this is just an oversight, this 'bug' has been present since the
original patches have been merged in.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html




[Index of Archives]     [Linux Filesystem Development]     [Linux USB Development]     [Linux Media Development]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Info]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux