On Fri, Aug 19, 2011 at 10:32:03AM +1000, paul.szabo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > Dear Linux-NFS people, > > NFS has always had the root_squash option, to protect against a remote > and possibly evil root. NFS should also protect all privileged, or at > least all root-equivalent, UIDs and GIDs. Many UNIX distributions have > root-equivalent GIDs, groups whose members could easily become root, > some listed in http://bugs.debian.org/299007#219 . Hm. It depends on what you're using the exports for, I suppose. If the server exports something it doesn't itself use for anything important then the server should be safe against clients. The clients though may be able to attack each other if say /usr/bin is mounted over NFS and is writeable by some non-root group. OK, I guess that's what you're saying. > Currently, NFS has no ways to protect privileged UIDs and GIDs other > than root himself. Such options should be implemented, to make NFS > safer and more useful. As I understand it, the hold-up is not within > NFS code, but with kernel interfaces not supporting lists of squashed > entities. I am asking you to devise and implement such interfaces. That's not a small project, so we'd need a volunteer. As Neil says kerberos might also help. --b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
