Re: [PATCH] libtirpc: handle large numbers of supplemental groups gracefully (try #2)

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Tue, 16 Feb 2010 14:24:09 -0500
Peter Staubach <staubach@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Jeff Layton wrote:
> > This is the second attempt at this patch. The main changes are that this
> > one doesn't set a floor value for the size of the group list. There are
> > also a few minor cleanups and comments added.
> > 
> > If authunix_create_default() is called by a user with more than 16
> > supplimental groups, it'll abort(), which causes the program to crash
> > and coredump.
> > 
> > Fix it to handle this situation gracefully. Get the number of groups
> > that the user has first, and then allocate a big enough buffer to hold
> > them. Then, just don't let the lower function use more than the NGRPS
> > groups.
> > 
> > Also fix up the error handling in this function so that it just returns
> > a NULL pointer on error and logs a message via warnx() instead of
> > calling abort().
> > 
> > Reported-by: Peter Engel <peter.engel@xxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  src/auth_unix.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> >  1 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/src/auth_unix.c b/src/auth_unix.c
> > index 71ca15d..a295e71 100644
> > --- a/src/auth_unix.c
> > +++ b/src/auth_unix.c
> > @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
> >  #include <stdlib.h>
> >  #include <unistd.h>
> >  #include <string.h>
> > +#include <errno.h>
> >  
> >  #include <rpc/types.h>
> >  #include <rpc/xdr.h>
> > @@ -175,20 +176,69 @@ AUTH *
> >  authunix_create_default()
> >  {
> >  	int len;
> > +	size_t bufsize = 0;
> >  	char machname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
> >  	uid_t uid;
> >  	gid_t gid;
> > -	gid_t gids[NGRPS];
> > +	gid_t *gids = NULL;
> > +	AUTH *auth;
> > +
> > +	if (gethostname(machname, sizeof machname) == -1) {
> > +		warnx("%s: gethostname() failed: %s", __func__,
> > +			strerror(errno));
> > +		return NULL;
> > +	}
> >  
> > -	if (gethostname(machname, sizeof machname) == -1)
> > -		abort();
> >  	machname[sizeof(machname) - 1] = 0;
> >  	uid = geteuid();
> >  	gid = getegid();
> > -	if ((len = getgroups(NGRPS, gids)) < 0)
> > -		abort();
> > +
> > +retry:
> > +	len = getgroups(0, NULL);
> > +	if (len < 0) {
> > +		warnx("%s: failed to get number of groups: %s", __func__,
> > +			strerror(errno));
> > +		return NULL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (len == 0)
> > +		goto no_groups;
> > +
> > +	bufsize = len * sizeof(gid_t);
> > +	gids = mem_alloc(bufsize);
> > +	if (gids == NULL) {
> > +		warnx("%s: memory allocation failed: %s", __func__,
> > +			strerror(ENOMEM));
> > +		return NULL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	len = getgroups(len, gids);
> > +	if (len < 0) {
> > +		mem_free(gids, bufsize);
> > +		/*
> > +		 * glibc equivalent routines mention that it's possible for
> > +		 * the number of groups to change between two getgroups calls.
> > +		 * If that happens, retry the whole thing again.
> > +		 */
> > +		if (len == -EINVAL) {
> > +			gids = NULL;
> > +			bufsize = 0;
> > +			goto retry;
> > +		}
> > +		warnx("%s: failed to get group list: %s", __func__,
> > +			strerror(errno));
> > +		return NULL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	/* AUTH_UNIX has a hard limit of NGRPS supplemental groups */
> > +	if (len > NGRPS)
> > +		len = NGRPS;
> > +
> > +no_groups:
> >  	/* XXX: interface problem; those should all have been unsigned */
> > -	return (authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, gids));
> > +	auth = authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, gids);
> > +	mem_free(gids, bufsize);
> > +	return auth;
> >  }
> >  
> >  /*
> 
> This change to restrict the groups used to the first NGRPS
> groups is one that we have always avoided.  It can be quite
> confusing to the user, to have an operation fail, but then
> to look and notice that the correct group is listed.
> 
> Having the library abort seems odd and wrong, but this will
> also change semantics.  Is there really a problem here,
> after all of these years, that must be addressed?
> 

Yes, we had a bug report against nfs-utils where someone was seeing
umount.nfs core dump because root was in >NGRPS groups.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=565507

...as Chuck points out, this is basically what glibc has done for
years. While it may be confusing for users, I think it's more
preferable than having the programs fail outright.

What sort of behavior would you propose in its place?

-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

[Index of Archives]     [Linux Filesystem Development]     [Linux USB Development]     [Linux Media Development]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Info]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux