From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
capable() calls refer to enabled LSMs whether to permit or deny the
request. This is relevant in connection with SELinux, where a
capability check results in a policy decision and by default a denial
message on insufficient permission is issued.
It can lead to three undesired cases:
1. A denial message is generated, even in case the operation was an
unprivileged one and thus the syscall succeeded, creating noise.
2. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to ignore
those denial messages, hiding future syscalls, where the task
performs an actual privileged operation, leading to hidden limited
functionality of that task.
3. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to permit
the task the requested capability, while it does not need it,
violating the principle of least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/fhandle.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c
index 5f801139358e..01b3e14e07de 100644
--- a/fs/fhandle.c
+++ b/fs/fhandle.c
@@ -265,9 +265,9 @@ static inline bool may_decode_fh(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
if (ns_capable(root->mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS;
else if (is_mounted(root->mnt) &&
+ !has_locked_children(real_mount(root->mnt), root->dentry) &&
ns_capable(real_mount(root->mnt)->mnt_ns->user_ns,
- CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- !has_locked_children(real_mount(root->mnt), root->dentry))
+ CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS | HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE;
else
return false;
--
2.45.2
