On Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 02:52:44PM -0400, Peter Staubach wrote: > J. Bruce Fields wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 02:33:50PM -0400, Peter Staubach wrote: > >> Some servers will accept any flavor of incoming RPC security > >> and just use AUTH_NULL in this situation. It really shouldn't > >> matter what the client sends, as long as the server is just > >> going to map all requests to nobody/nobody anyway... > > > > OK, but let's not pile on more workarounds than we have to. I don't see > > any reason that we really need to do anything special for servers that > > are broken in *that* particular way.... > > > > I don't think that that is considered to be broken, by the way. OK, maybe not. > I am not sure whether it still works this way, but I know that > Solaris used to work this way, at the very least. > > Since I clearly haven't looked, but why would the Linux NFS > server care which flavor that it got sent, if the export is > configured to map all requests to nobody/nobody? I can think of any number of reasons, but on the client side I don't see any great advantage to taking "auth_null" to mean "use anything you want": it's another special case, it's undocumented and will only work on some servers, and if it's really what the administrator wants, it should be easy to fix the server to advertise everything while still doing the id-squashing. --b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
