Hi Trond,
I wonder if you would consider including the following patch which
makes nfs_file_cred a little more robust.
It isn't strictly needed with current mainline. However we have a patch
set which (among other things) passes a 'struct file' down (via
ATTR_FILE) for a chmod call.
If chmod is called on e.g. a device special file, this will cause
nfs3_proc_setattr to call nfs_file_cred on a 'struct file' which does
not have an associated open context or credential. That goes Oops.
Thanks for your consideration,
NeilBrown
--------------
From: NeilBrown <neilb@xxxxxxx>
As not all files have an associated open_context (e.g. device special
files), it is safest to test for the existence of the open context
before de-referencing it.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@xxxxxxx>
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
index 78a5922..63bf8f0 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
@@ -372,8 +372,12 @@ static inline struct nfs_open_context *nfs_file_open_context(struct file *filp)
static inline struct rpc_cred *nfs_file_cred(struct file *file)
{
- if (file != NULL)
- return nfs_file_open_context(file)->cred;
+ if (file != NULL) {
+ struct nfs_open_context *ctx =
+ nfs_file_open_context(file);
+ if (ctx)
+ return ctx->cred;
+ }
return NULL;
}
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